

Occasional Paper No. 93

**The 1995 Malaysian
General Elections**
A Report and Commentary

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The 1995 Malaysian General Elections

A Report and Commentary

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Cataloguing in Publication Data

Gomez, Edmund Terence.

The 1995 Malaysian general elections: a report and commentary.
(Occasional paper/Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; no. 93)

1. Elections—Malaysia

2. Malaysia. Parlimen. Dewan Rakyat—Elections, 1995.

3. Malaysia—Politics and government

I. Title

II. Series

DS501 .159 no. 93

1996

sls 96-51040

ISBN 981-3055-24-3

ISSN 0073-9731

M

324 9595

Published by
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Pasir Panjang
Singapore 119596

EDM

Internet e-mail: publish@iseas.ac.sg
WWW: <http://merlion.iseas.ac.sg/pub.html>

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Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd
Printed in Singapore by Stamford Press Pte Ltd

925871

Perpustakaan Negara
Malaysia

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Preface

Long before the 1995 General Elections were called, most observers of Malaysian politics were already predicting — correctly as it turned out — a landslide victory for the ruling *Barisan Nasional* (BN, or National Front) coalition, which is dominated by the United Malays' National Organisation (UMNO). The question thus that arises is, why is a study of this general election necessary, and what new insights can it offer? Such a study provides an opportunity to gauge the salient issues that affect the electorate — some of which are seen from the subjects raised during the campaign — and to try to chart the future of Malaysian politics given the existing situation. This is particularly important in the context of Malaysia's diverse multi-ethnic society where there are significant differences in the issues that concern the various ethnic communities, while a rural working-class voter and an urban middle-class voter would also probably view issues differently, thus affecting their choices. Issues of importance to the electorate may also differ when viewed from regional perspectives, for example, from the point of view of those in Sabah and Sarawak or different parts of the peninsula.

The need to undertake a study of the 1995 General Elections also arose from my observation that the research methodology of studies on Malaysian general elections has generally been based on data obtained from secondary sources. I had hoped that an analysis based primarily on research conducted in the field during the campaign period, supplemented by detailed analyses of information from secondary sources, would generate better insights. It could be argued, however, that in view of the short campaign period, such a combination of research methodologies should concentrate attention on a case study, for example, in the hotly contested Tanjung Bunga state seat in Penang where opposition Leader Lim Kit Siang challenged incumbent Chief Minister Koh Tsu Koon. The main emphasis of my project, however, was to obtain a national perspective rather than undertake a regional study. This was particularly so since I felt that this election would be keenly fought in the Malay heartland states of Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu, and that there was thus a need to witness Malay politics in action. I was also keen to see

the impact of the Democratic Action Party (DAP) on the Malay electorate in Penang and the reaction of the Chinese to the opposition after much economic and cultural liberalization. The situation in Sabah was also intriguing since this was the first election in the state following the BN's controversial takeover of the state government in 1994 despite losing the state election. The desire to provide a national perspective of the elections which would encompass an overview of the major political events in the country meant that I had to concentrate my attention on a few states. Sabah, Kedah, Penang, Kelantan, and Terengganu were chosen since the key issues affecting the electorate were likely to be raised in those states where the BN was expected to face a keen battle from the opposition.

Since Malaysian politics has always been dominated by UMNO and since any analysis of a general election has to take into consideration the party's hegemonic role within the BN, much attention in this study is also focused on the issue of UMNO factionalism, and its possible bearing on future political developments. It was expected that much of the factionalism prevalent within UMNO, evidenced not only in the 1993 UMNO General Assembly but also subsequently, would probably be borne out during the general election. For example, one keenly-watched event during the election was whether Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad would allow his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, to further consolidate his position in UMNO by allowing some of the latter's close associates to be nominated as candidates and eventually brought into the Cabinet or be appointed as *Mentri Besar* (Chief Minister) of key states.

I am aware of several drawbacks of this study: for example, it will be painfully obvious to everyone that very limited study was done on the political situation in Sarawak. Unlike Sabah, however, Sarawak has, of late, been a safe haven for the BN and it was expected that the coalition's component parties would secure overwhelming support. Furthermore, since this project was limited to Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Penang, and Sabah, most of the analyses pertain to the events that transpired in these states. Since there were a number of states that had to be covered within a period of ten days, I had to concentrate on the campaigns conducted by the opposition; this was imperative in view of their limited access to the Press. While this meant that I had to depend on secondary data, particularly the newspapers, to provide me with much information on how the BN launched their campaign, I also, however, made it a point to attend some BN *ceramah* (political gatherings) and visit UMNO's operation centres to watch their legendary machinery in motion. From here, however, I have tried to present an overview of national politics as it was played out during the elections.

I am indebted to the University of Malaya for providing me with the funding I required to undertake this project. I would also like to thank the

numerous politicians and party workers who took time off from their busy campaign schedules to involve me in discussions and to show me how they conducted their campaign; this has immeasurably helped me to identify the key issues in the election campaign. I am also grateful to Dr. Chandran Jeshurun, formerly of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), who was most supportive of this project and with whom I held numerous discussions on Malaysian politics; his views and experience proved very insightful in the writing of this monograph. Professor Jomo K.S. of the University of Malaya provided some useful suggestions that helped to improve the content. I have also benefited from my discussions with journalists Ismail Kassim and Paul Gabriel. I am grateful to Ngeow Yoke Meng for translating the articles in the Chinese Press, and to Lin Duan Lib for her assistance in collating data. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the support of my wife Sharmani who as usual undertook the task of keeping our two effervescent young children, Evie and Eric, entertained while I undertook projects that took me away from our home.

This brief monograph is by no means an exhaustive study of the 1995 General Elections; this volume presents only an assessment of the main issues of the general election and contemporary UMNO politics. It is hoped, however, that this study might precipitate further research on not only the 1995 General Elections but also on the developments within the area of Malay politics, which may probably have a profound bearing on the direction of Malaysian politics.

I The State of Play

During Malaysia's Ninth General Elections, held on 24–25 April 1995, the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN, or National Front) coalition retained control of the government with one of its most exceptional electoral victories. The election had long been anticipated, with Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad fobbing off election speculation from as early as March 1994. Since 1974, all general elections had been held after around four-year intervals — despite the constitutional allowance for a five-year term — and this was the longest ever term for the BN government before the Prime Minister announced the dissolution of Parliament on 5 April 1995. Thus, for almost a year prior to the elections, all political parties were aware of the likelihood of a snap election. Despite this, most opposition parties were unable to work out an effective campaign strategy to counter the growing popularity that the BN seemed to enjoy among the electorate. The BN eventually went on to win 162 of the 192 parliamentary seats, obtaining 3,862,694 votes in contrast to the 2,075,822 votes secured by the opposition; thus, even though the BN had secured only 65.05 per cent of the popular vote, it obtained 84.3 per cent of the seats in Parliament. At the state level, the BN won 66.88 per cent of the popular vote and 85.8 per cent of the total number of seats in the states where elections were held.

It was obvious that the Prime Minister had dissolved Parliament only after ensuring that the BN had resolved or addressed some of the main problems that had emerged in early 1994 and tarnished the image and credibility of the ruling coalition, particularly that of its dominant partner, Mahathir's United Malays' National Organisation (UMNO). Among the most awkward issues involved was the BN's successful manoeuvrings to gain control of the Sabah state government following the state elections in February 1994. Although the opposition Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS, or Sabah United Party) had retained a narrow majority by winning 25 of the 48 state seats in the election, the defection of numerous PBS assemblymen to the BN — some of whom had presumably been bought over — led to the fall of the nine-year-old PBS state government.

The BN government had also been embarrassed by an alleged sex scandal involving the UMNO Youth Head and Chief Minister of Malacca, Rahim Tambi Chik, and a 15-year-old schoolgirl. The announcement by the Attorney-General that the Malacca Chief Minister would not be prosecuted for statutory rape was subject to much criticism from most quarters of society.

Some state governments were also involved in messy land acquisition legalities and protests over huge development proposals. Among the major projects that had aroused much dissension were the M\$17 billion Jerai International Park — shelved in April 1994 after much public pressure — and the M\$60 million Kerpan tiger prawn project in Kedah, as well as a petrochemical plant project in Malacca undertaken by Petronas, the national petroleum corporation.

The BN government also came under severe criticism following disclosures that the son-in-law of the Minister of International Trade and Industry had received shares of two publicly-listed companies. Those shares had been disbursed by the Ministry under its *bumiputera* share allocation scheme. Under pressure, Minister Rafidah Aziz revealed that other recipients included a son of Mahathir, a brother of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, relatives of a deputy minister, and other UMNO politicians. Apart from this, the government was criticized for the massive losses incurred by Bank Negara, the central bank, in the previous two years following speculative activities on the foreign exchange market.

The government's use of the Internal Security Act (ISA) to detain without trial the leaders of a presumably fundamentalist Islamic sect, the Al-Arqam (subsequently banned for propagating deviant Islamic teachings), came under attack by both local and foreign human rights organizations, which viewed the detention as further evidence of the undemocratic use of a rather draconian legislation. Not long after his detention, the Al-Arqam leader, Ashaari Muhammad, confessed over national television that the teachings of his movement were indeed deviant.

The government also had to contend with new forms of social malaise that had emerged, especially among urban Malay teenagers. Popularly known as *bohsia* and *lepak*, the former involved promiscuous and immoral activities, and loitering in public places in the case of the latter.

In many respects, these issues highlighted some of the main themes that would emerge during the election campaign: the repercussions of rapid economic development on society; the interpretation of Islam by political parties and its role in a rapidly developing society; the limited extent of democratization within the country that impeded attempts to ensure accountability within the government; and factionalism within UMNO, which threatened severe reverberations on the economy and society if left unchecked.

Early BN Campaign Strategies

Since the decision on when Parliament would be dissolved is entirely the prerogative of the Prime Minister, the BN began making early preparations for the elections with an extensive media blitz almost a year before the election. Ostensibly patriotic and catchy jingles, emphasizing the prevailing ethnic harmony, economic prosperity, and moderate political leadership in the country, were broadcast daily over television and radio. In October 1994, the BN tabled in Parliament a budget that included no tax increases; on the contrary, there were to be numerous new tax breaks, and civil servants were given a one-month bonus.

Apart from this, the BN prepared the ground for the election by first attacking what it had reason to believe would probably be its most formidable opponent, the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS, or Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party). On 15 February 1995, UMNO held a large gathering — comprising about 5,000 divisional and branch leaders — at its headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, where Mahathir urged party leaders to convince the people that the claim that "Pas is Islam and Islam is Pas" was false.¹ A few days later, Mahathir fastened the "extremist" tag on PAS after journeying to the opposition heartland of Kota Bahru in Kelantan to warn Muslims of the "growing fanaticism among followers of a political group which, if left unchecked, would lead to violence".² Prior to this, on 10 February 1995, Deputy Prime Minister Anwar alleged that PAS was guilty of practising double standards by permitting *assabiyah* (blind and extreme loyalty towards an individual or a party),³ which enabled some of the Islamic party's leaders to remain above the law.⁴

Close on the heels of the UMNO gathering in February was another major event to convey to the electorate the idea of multi-racial unity within the BN coalition. For the first time since it was formed in 1974, the BN held a convention on 25 March 1995, less than two weeks before Parliament was dissolved. During his address, Mahathir stressed that "the cooperation, which is now the hallmark of the BN ... has given the Government credibility".⁵ A seven-point BN charter was also presented, which stressed, among other things, cultural growth leading ultimately to the creation of a national culture, sustainable economic growth involving equitable distribution of wealth, pursuit of knowledge to enhance capabilities to overcome global challenges, and the promotion of the cause of justice, democracy, and human rights.⁶

It appeared that this display of power-sharing among the BN component parties, and the image of cordial ethnic coexistence were important to counter the impact of the influential opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP), particularly on the non-Malays and in the state of Penang. Having made inroads among Penang Malays, the DAP had become increasingly

hopeful of wresting control of the state in the general elections. In the previous general elections in 1990, the DAP had won six of the 11 parliamentary seats and 14 of the 33 state seats in Penang. A 5 to 7 percentage point swing in Penang state seats held by the BN component party, Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan, or Malaysian People's Movement) and a 10 to 12 percentage point swing in UMNO-held constituencies to the opposition would be sufficient to bring about a change of the state government.⁷

The BN's main concern, however, was to recapture Kelantan, the only opposition-controlled state, led by the Malay-based coalition Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU, or United Islamic Movement), comprising PAS, Parti Melayu Semangat 46 (S46, or Spirit of 1946 Malay Party), and two minor Muslim-based parties, Barisan Jama'ah Islamiah (Berjasa, or Islamic People's Front) and the Hizbul Muslimin Malaysia (Hamim, or Malaysian Muslim Party). The S46 was a breakaway faction of UMNO, led by the influential Kelantan prince and Mahathir's erstwhile Finance Minister, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. When former S46 Youth leader Ibrahim Ali, who had defected to UMNO, was appointed parliamentary secretary to the Rural Development Ministry just prior to the general elections, it appeared that UMNO was sending a signal to S46 members that they could have a future in UMNO. Later, when the government-controlled local Press mentioned the possibility of an UMNO-S46 collaboration to form the Kelantan state government if both parties collectively secured enough seats, this was seen as another attempt by UMNO to wedge differences between PAS and S46 in APU. Previous state-level election results indicated that since PAS enjoyed the support of approximately 40 per cent of the Kelantanese electorate, it needed at least 10 per cent more support, which the S46 could provide, to secure victory in the state elections; thus, a split between the two parties would augur well for UMNO.

Apart from this, the BN was also concerned that a minimal swing of votes in certain state constituencies in Terengganu was sufficient for APU to wrest control of the state. In contrast to its sweeping victory in the 1986 General Elections, the BN lost two parliamentary seats in Terengganu following the collaboration between S46 and PAS in 1990. The BN also lost ten of 32 state seats to APU, while in six other state constituencies, the ruling coalition's victories were narrow, with majorities of less than 1,000 votes. A similar swing to the opposition in Mahathir's home state of Kedah, the BN felt, could also lead to an embarrassing loss of a few state and parliamentary seats.

Opposition Parties in Disarray

Unlike the run-up to the 1990 General Elections, there was limited co-operation among the opposition parties in 1995, especially after PAS sought

to implement *hudud* laws for Muslims in Kelantan.⁸ This made it difficult for S46 to continue playing the role of intermediary among the main opposition parties, particularly the DAP and PAS, to ensure some form of collaboration for mutual benefit, despite their political differences. There was also intra-party discontent, with certain S46 leaders complaining that their representatives in the Kelantan state government were too accommodating of PAS. Eventually, these inter-party differences contributed to the disintegration of the Gagasan Rakyat (People's Might) opposition coalition, which was formed just prior to the 1990 general elections, and comprised S46, DAP, the Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM, or Malaysian People's Party), and the All-Malaysian Indian Progressive Front (IPF), a splinter faction of the BN component party, the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). The DAP left the Gagasan Rakyat, claiming that its ties with S46 were being perceived as indirect support for PAS's *hudud* legislation and desire to form an Islamic state in Malaysia, while the IPF, floundering as an opposition party, applied to join the BN.

Meanwhile, in an attempt to stress its Malay credentials and attract greater Malay support, S46 incorporated the adjective "Melayu" (Malay) into its name. It seemed imperative for S46 to improve its image and popularity because the party was fraught with defections, exacerbating an increasingly tumultuous state of affairs within the party. However, while S46 hoped that this strategy would be effective in rural Malay areas, its leaders were aware that the party's stronger Malay line was actually eroding its support from non-Malays. In addition to its strong pro-Malay line, the S46's fading image as a credible alternative further diminished electorate support.

Within the DAP, a leadership crisis and internal squabbling transpired during much of 1994, causing even party leaders to publicly concede that the party would perform badly at the polls. Factionalism was most severe in the states of Perak and Negeri Sembilan. In Perak, the party's Deputy Secretary-General, P. Patto, who was involved in a dispute with another party stalwart, Ipoh Member of Parliament Lau Dak Kee, stepped down as the party's Perak chief, a move which was publicly attributed to the DAP's decision to send Patto to Penang to help the party secure victory in the state election.⁹ In Negeri Sembilan, Hu Sepang, a prominent DAP leader and former parliamentarian, resigned from the party. After the DAP announced its candidates for the 1995 General Elections, another 30 party members resigned from the party, with some even openly voicing their support for the BN.¹⁰

In Sabah, however, although the PBS had been considerably weakened by the defection to the BN of most of its senior leaders and the establishment of two new Kadazandusun parties, it was still uncertain if the party was a spent force, or if former Chief Minister Joseph Pairin Kitingan could consolidate his support within the Kadazandusun community. Aiding the PBS was the return to its fold of a number of members who had defected to

the BN after the state election. Since much lobbying and disagreements had emerged among BN politicians and politically well-connected businessmen over some of Sabah's lucrative privatized projects not long after the ruling coalition took control of the state, there was some expectation that Sabahans would support the opposition at Federal level.

Redelineation Exercise

Probably the most significant event that transpired before the 1995 General Elections was the redelineation of parliamentary and state constituencies undertaken by the Election Commission. The electorates in parliamentary constituencies had always been disproportionately smaller in rural, predominantly *bumiputera*, areas compared to mainly Chinese-majority, urban constituencies that favoured the BN, especially UMNO, whose main support base comprised the rural Malays.

After the redelineation exercise was completed in 1993, the number of parliamentary seats was increased from 180 to 192, of which 145 were in Peninsular Malaysia, 20 in Sabah, and 27 in Sarawak. The number of state seats was increased to 498, compared to 447 in 1990; of these, there were 394 seats in Peninsular Malaysia, 48 in Sabah, and 56 in Sarawak. In Penang, however, a redelineation exercise was not carried out after the BN failed to get the DAP's support in the state legislature. Prior to this redelineation exercise, the last major exercise was undertaken before the 1986 General Elections, when the number of parliamentary constituencies was increased from 154 to 177 and the number of state constituencies was increased from 408 to 447.¹¹ Between the 1986 and 1990 General Elections, while the number of parliamentary constituencies was increased by three, from 177 to 180, there was no increase in the number of state constituencies. Of the 12 new parliamentary seats that had been created by the redelineation exercise before the 1995 General Elections, the BN eventually allotted UMNO seven seats, its main partner in the ruling coalition, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), obtained three seats, and the MIC and Gerakan obtained one each.

Recognizing that PAS (with the co-operation of S46) could make inroads into the predominantly Malay states of Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah, UMNO was concerned about the repercussions of such a possibility on the party's *bumiputera* support. It was widely speculated that the second round of the voter registration exercise undertaken in 1994 was to enable more than 500,000 UMNO members and supporters to be registered. The BN was also fearful that it might not have sufficiently checked PBS' influence in Sabah to ensure that the latter's support was limited to a few Kadazandusun seats.

The BN's concerns about its declining support among rural *bumiputera* were logical in view of their over-representation in Parliament. While

bumiputera-majority constituencies constituted 57 per cent of the total number of parliamentary seats in the 1960s, this figure had risen to 65 per cent following the mid-1980s redelineation exercise. The *bumiputera* dominance in Parliament was also attributable to the over-representation of Sabahan and Sawarakian *bumiputera* who, especially in the case of the latter, tended to support BN component parties. For example, in 1990, although only 16.5 per cent of the population lived in Sabah and Sarawak, the 48 constituencies in these two states constituted 27 per cent of the seats in Parliament.¹² In such a situation, as Crouch noted,

any party able to win the overwhelming majority of Malay constituencies in the peninsula would almost certainly form the core of the federal government. Even if it lost all the non-Malay-majority seats, it could still rule provided it won virtually all the Malay-majority seats and retained the support of the main Bumiputera parties in East Malaysia.¹³

This meant that despite their ideological differences and with the presence of Razaleigh as an intermediary, if APU and PBS secured sufficient victories in the *bumiputera*-majority constituencies a coalition between both parties would serve as a threat to the BN's dominance in Parliament. In the 1990 General Elections, APU had wrested 15 *bumiputera*-majority parliamentary seats from the BN and had lost narrowly in a number of other *bumiputera*-majority seats, while the PBS had won 14 parliamentary seats in Sabah. In the case of the BN situation in Kelantan, since it only managed to surpass the 35 per cent vote-mark in four parliamentary seats — the trend was similar in most other state seats — during the 1990 General Elections, the ruling coalition needed to swing opposition votes by at least 20 percentage points to secure control of the state; the chances of such a swing in 1995 appeared rather doubtful.¹⁴ The situation in Terengganu also looked precarious for UMNO, while PAS seemed to be moving aggressively in Kedah.

By the mid-1990s, however, in contrast to the situation in the mid-1980s, the BN had become more popular among the non-*bumiputera* (see Chapter III). In a situation where the extent of the BN's support among rural *bumiputera* in the peninsula and the Kadazandusun community in Sabah was unclear, but where the non-*bumiputera*, especially the urban Chinese, seemed more likely to throw their support with the ruling coalition, it would appear that the redelineation of constituencies in 1993 was of benefit to the BN (Table 1).

Following the redelineation, the number of *bumiputera*-majority constituencies was increased by only three, from 114 to 117. The total number of *bumiputera*-majority constituencies now constituted 61 per cent of the seats in Parliament, a significant reduction of four percentage points from the situation in the 1980s. The number of evenly-divided

TABLE 1: IMPACT OF REDELINEATION EXERCISES ON ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION IN PARLIAMENTARY AND STATE CONSTITUENCIES BETWEEN THE 1986 AND 1995 GENERAL ELECTIONS

State	<i>Bumiputera</i> Majority Constituencies			<i>Non-bumiputera</i> Majority Constituencies			Evenly Divided Constituencies		
	1986	1995	Difference	1986	1995	Difference	1986	1995	Difference
Parliamentary Constituencies									
Perlis	2	3	+1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kedah	9	14	+5	—	—	—	5	1	-4
Kelantan	13	14	+1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Terengganu	8	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Penang	4	4	—	7	7	—	—	—	—
Perak	10	10	—	11	9	-2	2	4	+2
Pahang	7	8	+1	1	1	—	2	2	—
Selangor	6	8	+2	3	4	+1	5	5	—
Kuala Lumpur	2	1	-1	4	5	+1	1	4	+3
Labuan	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
N. Sembilan	3	3	—	2	2	—	2	2	—
Malacca	3	2	-1	1	1	—	1	2	+1
Johore	9	7	-2	5	4	-1	4	9	+5
Sabah	18	12	-6	2	4	+2	—	4	+4
Sarawak	19	22	+3	3	3	—	2	2	—
Total	114	117	(+3)	39	40	(+1)	24	35	(+11)

TABLE 1 (cont'd): IMPACT OF REDELINEATION EXERCISES ON ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION IN PARLIAMENTARY AND STATE CONSTITUENCIES BETWEEN THE 1986 AND 1995 GENERAL ELECTIONS

State	<i>Bumiputera</i> Majority Constituencies			<i>Non-bumiputera</i> Majority Constituencies			Evenly Divided Constituencies		
	1986	1995	Difference	1986	1995	Difference	1986	1995	Difference
State Constituencies									
Perlis	12	14	+2	-	1	+1	2	-	-2
Kedah	23	28	+5	1	5	+4	4	3	-1
Kelantan	38	43	+5	1	-	-1	-	-	-
Terengganu	32	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Penang	10	10	-	19	19	-	4	4	-
Perak	24	31	+7	17	17	-	5	4	-1
Pahang	21	28	+7	6	6	-	6	4	-2
Selangor	21	28	+7	11	13	+2	10	7	-3
N. Sembilan	16	20	+4	9	10	+1	3	2	-1
Malacca	10	14	+4	4	6	+2	6	5	-1
Johore	19	18	-1	8	10	+2	9	12	+3
Total	226	266	(40)	76	87	(9)	49	41	(-8)

NOTE: An ethnic community commands the majority in a constituency if its population is more than 55 per cent of the total electorate. The figures taken are to the nearest largest denominator.

SOURCES: *The Star*, 5 August 1986; *Utusan Malaysia*, 27 April 1995.

constituencies, however, was increased from 24 to 35. This increase was primarily in the states where the opposition enjoyed much support and which had large Chinese populations, that is Perak (from two to four), Sabah (from none to four), and in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur (from one to four); there was also a conspicuous increase in the number of evenly-divided constituencies in Johore (from four to nine). In Selangor, Kuala Lumpur, and Sabah, the number of non-*bumiputera*-majority constituencies was also increased, by one each in the case of the former two states and by two in the case of Sabah, though the number of such constituencies was reduced in Perak and Johore by two and one respectively (Table 1). In Kedah, however, despite fears of declining *bumiputera* support for the BN, the number of *bumiputera*-majority seats was increased by five, while the number of evenly-divided constituencies was reduced from five to one. In Sabah, the number of *bumiputera*-majority constituencies was decreased from 18 to 12, while the increase in the number of non-*bumiputera*-majority seats was from two to four, and the number of evenly-divided constituencies was increased from none to four. If, however, the Kadazandusun community is constituted separately from the Muslim *bumiputera*, the impact of the redelineation exercise for the BN becomes more obvious. While there were two Muslim *bumiputera*-majority seats, 11 Kadazandusun-Chinese-majority seats, and seven evenly-divided constituencies before the redelineation exercise, there were seven Muslim *bumiputera*-majority seats, ten Chinese-Kadazandusun-majority seats, and three evenly-divided constituencies following the exercise.

The redelineation of constituencies at state level, however, indicates a different pattern. While the total number of evenly-divided constituencies was reduced by eight (from 49 to 41), the number of *bumiputera*-majority seats was increased considerably by 40 (from 226 to 266); the number of non-*bumiputera*-majority seats was increased by nine (from 76 to 87) (Table 1). In Kedah, however, in contrast to the situation following the redelineation of parliamentary seats in the state, the number of non-*bumiputera*-majority seats was increased by four (from one to five seats) although the number of evenly-divided seats was reduced from four to three. This suggested an attempt to ensure BN's control of Kedah at the state-level since it was unlikely that the non-*bumiputera* would support PAS. Neither did it seem probable that the DAP would collaborate with the Islamic party to form the state government. In Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Malacca, and Pahang, which have large non-*bumiputera* populations, the number of *bumiputera*-majority seats was increased by between four and seven seats while the number of evenly-divided constituencies in all these states was reduced. In Selangor and Malacca, however, the number of non-*bumiputera*-majority seats increased by two each (Table 1).

Soon after the redelineation exercises, allegations of impropriety were made in some key states. In Sabah, it was reported that the redelineated parliamentary constituencies of Kota Belud, Libaran, Beaufort, and Sipitang had been transformed into Muslim-dominated seats, carved out in portions from Kadazandusun and Chinese areas, and thus seen to be benefiting the BN.¹⁵ In Selangor, following the redelineation exercise, there were opposition allegations that in areas where the numbers of Chinese were still the highest in terms of racial breakdown, their majority had been considerably reduced. The Petaling Jaya parliamentary constituency, for example, a traditional DAP stronghold comprising three state seats, was divided into two with four state seats.¹⁶

Apart from this, both APU and UMNO were accusing each other of transferring voters between constituencies in Kelantan. PAS and S46 alleged that UMNO had brought in 71,000 Muslim Thais and had dispatched them to key constituencies to vote in the impending election. In its turn, UMNO lodged a complaint that PAS had ferried in voters from other states to ensure victory in marginal seats.¹⁷

UMNO Factionalism

One probable reason why Prime Minister Mahathir may have delayed calling the election was the factional disputes within UMNO, both at national and state levels. The factionalism in Terengganu, for example, was so acute that party leaders were unable to contain it. Similar problems had emerged in the critical states of Kelantan, Penang, and Kedah.

At the national level, the political scenario within UMNO appeared unpredictable, with the possibility of another contentious party election looming in 1996. It was expected that Anwar Ibrahim, now well consolidated as UMNO Deputy President after ousting Ghafar Baba in the 1993 party election, would try to place some close confidantes — including contemporaries during his stewardship of the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, or the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement) — in senior party and government positions, thus putting pressure on the current batch of younger UMNO leaders who had supported him for the Deputy President's post. Already, it was believed that Rahim Tamby Chik had been manoeuvred out of office by Anwar's faction, while Najib Razak, another of Anwar's running mates in the "Vision Team" which had swept to power in the 1993 UMNO election, appeared to have fallen out with the Deputy President, and re-aligned himself with anti-Anwar elements. The Anwar-controlled Malay and English Press had sought to embarrass Najib by suggesting his alleged involvement in a *khalwat* (close proximity) case. Najib strongly denied the report but refused to take legal action against the Press. The allocation of publicly-listed shares to Rafidah Aziz's son-in-law by her ministry was also

given prominent coverage by most of the mainstream Malay and English Press, controlled by men closely aligned with Anwar;¹⁸ Rafidah is a well-known Anwar critic.¹⁹ Mahathir voiced his disapproval by criticizing "Press sensationalism". The Prime Minister's position, however, did not seem to be under any threat, though he was probably aware that he had not been cultivating his grassroots base as much as Anwar.²⁰

Another indication of the rifts within UMNO was the reemergence of Ghafar Baba in national politics early in 1995; Mahathir's public courting of the former Deputy Prime Minister was seen as yet another attempt to check Anwar's influence. The most worrisome political problem, however, seemed to be the increasingly public dispute between Anwar and the influential UMNO Treasurer and Government Economic Adviser, Daim Zainuddin, apparently Mahathir's closest confidante.

In early 1994, for example, a dispute appeared to have surfaced between Anwar and Daim, who served as Finance Minister from 1984 to 1991, over the manner in which privatized contracts were being distributed by the government. The dispute was apparently precipitated by the scale of the privatization benefits enjoyed by businessmen close to Daim. For example, at the end of 1993, the government had finalized the sale of a 32 per cent stake in Malaysia Airlines Bhd (MAS) to Tajudin Ramli, a longstanding business associate of Daim.²¹ At about the same time, Robert Tan Hua Choon, reportedly another Daim associate, obtained a lucrative privatized contract through his company, Spanco Sdn Bhd, to service government-owned vehicles.²² In January 1994, Malaysia's largest privatized contract, the M\$15 billion Bakun Dam project, which had been earmarked for privatization to a company in which the Sarawak state government would have had a stake, was awarded in toto and without tender at the eleventh hour to Ting Pek Khiing, allegedly after Daim's intervention.²³ In 1994, United Engineers (M) Bhd (UEM), controlled by Daim's most well-known protegee, Halim Saad, through Renong Bhd, obtained the privatized contract to construct the second link causeway between Malaysia and Singapore. During this period, there was also strong speculation that a majority stake in Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd, Malaysia's second largest bank, would be sold by the government to Landmarks Bhd, controlled by another close associate of Daim's, Samsudin Abu Hassan, who had no previous banking experience.²⁴

The increasingly public dispute among UMNO leaders over the distribution of state rents suggested that not only was there little consensus and insufficient resources to satisfy all groups, but that such conflicts would become more acute and severe as resources became more scarce, especially after the most lucrative assets for privatization had been sold. Furthermore, since it was obvious to aspiring UMNO leaders that Anwar had effectively dispatched the influential Ghafar to the backbenches in 1993, and that he

nurtured ambitions for the UMNO presidency, most were placed in a dilemma — UMNO history has repeatedly indicated the setbacks and repercussions that could befall a politician's career for supporting the wrong faction.

Notes

1. *New Straits Times*, 16 February 1995.
2. *The Star*, 23 February 1995.
3. Anwar had raised the *assabiyah* issue in relation to PAS's defence of one of its leaders, Mohamed Sabu, who had been charged in the Islamic *syariah* court with *khalwat*, or close proximity with a person of an opposite sex who is not a relative (*New Straits Times*, 11 February 1995). Mohamed Sabu, who maintained that he had been framed, was eventually discharged by the court without his defence being called.
4. *New Straits Times*, 11 February 1995.
5. *New Straits Times*, 26 March 1995.
6. *The Star*, 26 March 1995.
7. *The Sun*, 16 April 1995.
8. *Hudud* refers to the type of punishments for crimes such as robbery, fornication, and stealing as set out in the Koran. For a comprehensive account of the views held by PAS and UMNO on the legislation, see Maria L. Seda-Poulin's "Islamization and Legal Reform in Malaysia: The *Hudud* Controversy of 1992" in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1993* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993).
9. Despite Patto's departure for Penang, Lau Dak Kee and Foo Piew Kok, the DAP Member of Parliament for Batu Gajah, who were both offered parliamentary seats, declined nomination. Instead, DAP Secretary General Lim Kit Siang nominated Kerk Kim Hock and Teresa Kok, his political secretary, as the DAP Perak chairman and secretary respectively just before the general election; both were also nominated as parliamentary candidates in Perak during the election.
10. *The Star*, 17 April 1995.
11. The last redelineation exercise before the 1986 General Elections was undertaken after the 1969 General Elections, which meant that there was no change in the number of parliamentary and state constituencies during the 1978 and 1982 General Elections. During the redelineation exercise prior to the 1986 General Elections, the number of parliamentary constituencies was increased from 144 to 154 and the number of state constituencies from 362 to 408 (*NSTP Research and Information Services*, 1994, p. 145).
12. Harold Crouch, "Malaysia: Do Elections Make a Difference?", paper presented at the Elections in Southeast Asia: Meaning and Practice? Conference, The Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 16–18 September 1993.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *The Star*, 1 April 1995.

15. *Daily Express* [Sabah], 15 April 1995.
16. *New Straits Times*, 13 April 1995.
17. *The Sun*, 7 April 1995.
18. In the run-up to the 1993 UMNO party election, Anwar managed to gain control of the New Straits Times Group, which publishes the prominent English and Malay dailies, *New Straits Times* and *Berita Harian*, and a Chinese newspaper, *Shin Min Daily News*. Anwar also managed to place his supporters in key editorial positions in the influential Malay daily, *Utusan Malaysia* (Gomez 1994, pp. 130–35).
19. Rafidah, in turn, revealed in Parliament that among other recipients of such shares were Anwar's brother, Marzuki Ibrahim, Mahathir's son, Mirzan Mahathir, and Deputy Home Affairs Minister Megat Junid's son and brother-in-law (*Asiaweek*, 30 November 1994). Rafidah cast further aspersions on Anwar's credibility by suggesting an investigation into the allocation of shares of six other publicly-listed companies that had been undertaken by Anwar's Finance Ministry. Although pressured by the opposition in Parliament to disclose the names of the recipients of the shares, Anwar declined to do so (*Asiaweek*, 10 February 1995). These revelations confirmed a long-held suspicion that UMNO leaders had been channelling publicly-listed equity meant for the *bumiputera* community to close allies, supporters, and relatives. Rafidah's disclosure even upset UMNO members who were unaware of the extent to which such share allocations were distributed among family members of senior party leaders.
20. There had been a growing belief after the 1993 UMNO party elections that Mahathir had lost control of the party. Even in April 1994, almost six months after the party election, *Asiaweek* (11 April 1994) quoted various analysts as saying: "What power base has Mahathir got left? Not very much. He's allowed Anwar to build himself up considerably" and "Mahathir effectively lost control in November of the political party he heads".
21. *The Star*, 16 June 1994.
22. *Malaysian Business*, 16 August 1993.
23. *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 2 February 1994 for details on this controversial privatization.
24. *Malaysian Business*, 16 March 1994.

II The Campaign

Nomination of Opposition Candidates

On Nomination Day, 15 April 1995, the BN won unopposed 11 of the 192 parliamentary seats and nine of the 394 state seats — state elections were not held in Sabah and Sarawak. Nine of the 11 parliamentary seats were won in Sarawak, while Selangor and Perak yielded one each. Of the state seats, five were won in Selangor, two in Terengganu, and one each in Malacca and Johore. The nomination of one BN candidate was rejected, for the constituency of Gua Musang, Kelantan, whose incumbent Member of Parliament was Razaleigh Hamzah, the S46 President; Razaleigh, however, had to contest against a candidate from a BN-sponsored breakaway PAS faction, the Angkatan Keadilan Islam Malaysia (AKIM, or Malaysian Islamic Justice Movement).

Although 181 of the 192 parliamentary seats were to be contested, no individual opposition party fielded sufficient number of candidates to form a government on its own (Table 2). However, the number of seats contested by the APU coalition, comprising S46 and PAS, totalled 110, which would enable it to form the government provided it won at least 97 seats, although the possibility of this appeared very remote in view of S46's declining support on the west coast of the peninsula. In the case of state elections, however, the opposition had a nominal chance of winning every state (Table 3). The APU coalition nominated a sufficient number of candidates to capture Perlis, Kedah, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Malacca, Pahang, Terengganu, Kelantan, and even Johore. The DAP, however, stood a chance of only capturing Penang, which indicated that it was concentrating much of its efforts on securing victory in the Penang state election (Table 3). Even at the parliamentary level, the DAP had limited the number of constituencies it was contesting to merely 50.

There was evidence of some co-operation among opposition parties: 136 of the 181 contested parliamentary seats were straight fights. Of the remaining, 37 were three-cornered contests, six were four-cornered, and two were five-cornered. Previous election results indicated that, in most cases,

TABLE 2: MALAYSIAN PARTIES CONTESTING
PARLIAMENTARY SEATS, 1995

State	Political Parties							
	BN	S46	PAS	DAP	PRM	PBS	AKIM	Ind.
Perlis	3	1	2	-	-	-	-	-
Kedah	15	6	9	-	-	-	-	1
Kelantan*	13	8	6	-	-	-	2	1
Terengganu	8	4	4	-	-	-	-	-
Penang	11	2	2	8	-	3	-	-
Perak	23	9	5	11	-	-	-	3
Pahang	11	6	3	2	-	-	-	3
Selangor	17	11	3	3	1	-	-	2
N. Sembilan	7	3	2	3	-	-	-	1
Kuala Lumpur	10	2	2	6	1	-	-	2
Sarawak	27	-	-	6	-	3	-	19
Sabah	20	-	1	4	-	20	-	10
Labuan	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Malacca	5	2	2	2	-	-	-	-
Johore	20	11	4	5	1	1	-	1
Total	191	65	45	50	3	28	2	43

* The BN's nomination for one parliamentary seat in Kelantan was rejected.

SOURCE: *Berita Harian*, 16 April 1995.

TABLE 3: PARTIES CONTESTING PENINSULAR MALAYSIAN
STATE SEATS, 1995

State	Political Parties								
	BN	S46	PAS	DAP	PRM	PBS	AKIM	Berjasa	Ind.
Perlis	15	5	10	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kedah	36	5	30	5	-	1	-	-	1
Kelantan	43	15	27	-	-	-	15	1	2
Terengganu	32	11	19	-	-	-	-	-	3
Penang	33	4	7	26	-	7	-	-	-
Perak	52	12	22	19	-	-	-	-	7
Pahang	38	16	16	9	-	-	-	-	4
Selangor	48	15	17	15	-	-	-	-	4
N. Sembilan	32	18	5	10	-	-	-	-	9
Malacca	25	7	17	9	-	-	-	-	-
Johore	40	22	8	10	2	1	-	-	4
Total	394	130	178	103	2	9	15	1	34

SOURCE: *Berita Harian*, 16 April 1995.

the opposition stood a better chance of securing victory against the BN if the contests were straight fights.

There were, however, conspicuous signs of failure to co-operate between certain opposition parties: the ongoing feud between the PBS and DAP culminated in a decision by both parties to field candidates in four, predominantly Chinese-majority, seats in Sabah although this significantly diminished the possibility of either party securing victory against the BN. In the peninsula, where the PBS was trying to gain a foothold, most of the seven state and three parliamentary candidates fielded by the party were to contest seats in Penang where the DAP was concentrating its campaign. In fact, one of these three Chinese-majority parliamentary seats was DAP Secretary General Lim Kit Siang's Tanjung constituency where he had to face Khor Gark Kim, the PBS' most prominent candidate in Peninsular Malaysia. Apart from this, the DAP was involved with the BN in straight fights in only 17 parliamentary seats, further diminishing the possibility that the opposition party would fare well in the federal level elections. PAS was involved in two-cornered fights with the BN in 30 parliamentary seats, while the BN and S46 were involved in 55 straight fights.

One of the most significant developments on nomination day was the DAP's confirmation of its resolve to wrest control of Penang, reflected in Lim Kit Siang's decision to contest the Tanjung Bunga state seat held by the state's popular Chief Minister, Koh Tsu Koon. In total, the DAP fielded candidates in 26 of the 33 state seats. The party was also to contest eight of the 11 parliamentary seats, while in the remaining three seats — all Malay-majority constituencies — S46 fielded two candidates and PAS one; PAS also fielded another candidate in Deputy Prime Minister Anwar's constituency of Permatang Pauh, where the DAP had also nominated a candidate. S46 was also to contest four state seats, while PAS fielded candidates for seven state seats. To capture *bumiputera* support, ten of the DAP's 26 state candidates and one of its eight parliamentary candidates were Malays. Despite the number of opposition parties contesting seats in Penang, the nomination line-up tended to favour the opposition because they were involved in straight fights with the BN in 22 state constituencies, while the remaining 11 were three-cornered fights. In four of these three-cornered contests, the DAP and PAS were confronting the BN in areas where there was a large Malay electorate — Permatang Pasir (65.2 per cent), Teluk Bahang (59.9 per cent), Bayan Lepas (49 per cent), and Sungai Pinang (31.8 per cent); in at least three of these constituencies, it appeared that PAS's participation could augur well for the DAP by splitting the Malay electorate. The DAP, however, maintained that it had no secret electoral pact with PAS.¹

In the contest for control of the predominantly Malay states of Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu, the nomination line-up also favoured the

opposition. Of the 43 Kelantan state seats, PAS was to contest 27 seats, S46 was to field candidates in 15 seats, while the other APU coalition member, Berjasa, was to contest the remaining seat. AKIM was to stand in 15 constituencies while two independent candidates had filed their nominations in separate seats. Hence, there were straight fights in 27 state constituencies, three-cornered fights for 15 other seats, and one four-cornered fight.

In Terengganu, S46 was to contest 11 of the 32 seats while PAS took on the BN for 19 other seats when the nominations of two PAS candidates were rejected. Of the 30 seats contested in Terengganu, the BN was involved in straight fights with the APU in 27 constituencies. In Kedah, all the major opposition parties fielded candidates — PAS 30 seats, S46 and DAP five seats each, and the PBS one seat — for the 36 state seats. There were straight fights in 30 constituencies and three-cornered fights in six other areas.

Nomination of BN Candidates

Of the final list of BN candidates nominated for the elections, UMNO members were to contest 103 of the 192 parliamentary seats (Table 4). This was the first time since the 1964 General Elections that UMNO was contesting more than half the total number of parliamentary seats.² The main reason for this was UMNO's participation, for the first time, in the Sabah parliamentary polls where the party had been allocated ten seats. This meant that if UMNO won at least 97 of these parliamentary seats, it could rule the country without the co-operation of the other BN component parties. UMNO, however, had no presence in Sarawak and depended on the major Sarawakian party, Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB, or United Bumiputera Party) (Table 4).

For the state elections, UMNO could form a state government on its own in all Peninsular Malaysian states except Penang (Table 5), reflecting its hegemony in the BN. Historically, the dependence of most other BN component parties on UMNO to secure victory is well-known. The MCA, the MIC, the Gerakan, the Sarawak-based Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), and the Sabah-based Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP) and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), for example, though claiming to represent the non-*bumiputera*, had to once again fall back on *bumiputera* support to ensure victory in most of the parliamentary and state constituencies where they had to face DAP and PBS candidates.

Despite winning 20 parliamentary and state seats unopposed on Nomination Day, there was much dissension in the BN component parties over the candidates nominated, especially among UMNO members in Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah. In Terengganu, for example, Ahmad Sidi Ismail, a former UMNO division head, rejected his party's nomination to

TABLE 4: BREAKDOWN OF MALAYSIAN PARLIAMENTARY SEATS CONTESTED BY THE MAIN BN COMPONENT PARTIES, 1995

State	Political Parties					Total
	UMNO	MCA	MIC	Gerakan	PBB	
Perlis	3	-	-	-	-	3
Kedah	13	2	-	-	-	15
Kelantan	14*	-	-	-	-	14
Terengganu	8	-	-	-	-	8
Penang	4	3	-	4	-	11
Perak	11	7	2	3	-	23
Pahang	8	3	-	-	-	11
Selangor	8	6	3	-	-	17
N. Sembilan	4	2	1	-	-	7
Kuala Lumpur	3	4	-	3	-	10
Sarawak	-	-	-	-	10	27
Sabah	10	-	-	-	-	20
Labuan	1	-	-	-	-	1
Malacca	3	2	-	-	-	5
Johore	13	6	1	-	-	20
Total	103	35	7	10	10	192

* UMNO's nomination for the Gua Musang seat was rejected; the total number of seats contested by the party in Kelantan was 13.

SOURCE: *New Straits Times*, 27 April 1995.

TABLE 5: BREAKDOWN OF PENINSULAR MALAYSIAN STATE SEATS CONTESTED BY THE MAIN BN COMPONENT PARTIES, 1995

State	Political Parties			
	UMNO	MCA	MIC	Gerakan
Perlis	13	2	-	-
Kedah	28	4	2	2
Kelantan	42	1	-	-
Terengganu	31	1	-	-
Penang	12	9	1	11
Perak	30	14	3	5
Pahang	28	8	1	1
Selangor	30	12	3	3
N. Sembilan	20	8	2	1
Malacca	16	8	1	-
Johore	25	11	2	2
Total	268	75	15	27

* There were no state elections in Sarawak and Sabah.

SOURCE: *New Straits Times*, 27 April 1995.

stand in the Hulu Teregganu parliamentary seat. When nominations were closed, that particular parliamentary seat and the four state constituencies within it were all to be contested by five UMNO newcomers. It was reported that on the eve of Nomination Day, Mahathir had refused to attend a function at the party's headquarters in Alor Setar, Kedah to avoid facing protests over the selection of candidates.³ In Kelantan, there was intense bickering over the final list of candidates despite the intervention of federal leaders, including the Prime Minister and his deputy. In Negeri Sembilan, Mentri Besar (Chief Minister) Isa Samad was challenged by his former political secretary.

Mahathir's decision that four federal ministers contest state seats was also interpreted as another response to UMNO factionalism. Agriculture Minister Sanusi Junid, Youth and Sports Minister Abdul Ghani Othman, and Public Enterprises Minister Yusof Noor, none of whom were aligned to Deputy Prime Minister Anwar, were sent to contest state seats in Kedah, Johore, and Terengganu respectively. In the case of all three ministers, it was believed that they would eventually be appointed Mentri Besar of their respective states. The parliamentary backbenchers' president, Shahidan Kassim, who is not seen to be as close to the Deputy Prime Minister, was nominated to contest a state constituency in Malaysia's smallest state, Perlis, where he was tipped to be the next Mentri Besar.

Meanwhile, another Cabinet member, Napsiah Omar, the National Unity Minister and deputy leader of Wanita UMNO, an Anwar supporter unlike Rafidah Aziz, the influential women's leader, was nominated to contest a state seat in Negeri Sembilan after which it was believed that she would, at most, be appointed a state executive committee member; it was an unusual and embarrassing demotion for Napsiah. Anwar's former political secretary and Deputy Chief Minister of Penang, Dr. Ibrahim Saad, was nominated for a parliamentary seat, while it was speculated that his position would be filled by a supporter of Anwar's arch foe in the state, Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Two of Anwar's closest confidantes, former ABIM leaders Kamaruddin Jaffar and Kamaruddin Mohd Nor, were nominated to contest parliamentary constituencies in Kelantan which UMNO had almost no hope of winning.

Not all of Anwar's supporters, however, were sent into obscurity. Prominent Anwar allies, UMNO Youth Acting President Nazri Aziz and Bank Simpanan Nasional chairman and UMNO Youth council member Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, were nominated to contest parliamentary seats. Mahathir's decision, however, to retain Ghafar Baba and Daim Zainuddin as BN parliamentarians, despite the latter's open desire to retire from politics, was also seen as a move to undermine Anwar's influence both in the political and corporate arenas.

Manifestos and Party Machinery

The emphasis of the BN manifesto, *Vision, Justice, Efficiency*, was on Malaysia's peaceful and harmonious multi-racial, multi-lingual, and multi-religious society, its impressive economic record (which had registered an average growth rate of above 8 per cent over the past seven years and an unemployment rate of a mere 3 per cent), extensive economic liberalization, which had promoted the internationalization of the economy and attracted increased foreign investments, and liberalization of policies on culture and education, which, in the case of the latter, had opened up tertiary educational opportunities to more young Malaysians and had helped to promote human resource development.

As for the opposition parties, PAS' 14-point manifesto, *Progress with Islam*, offered the people spiritual upliftment, a more moral, principled, and accountable administration, and reformation of society — through changes to legislation — based on religious tenets. Among the party's objectives were the abolishment of repressive legislation and unhealthy economic activities (such as gambling), the replacement of the new and unpopular government pay scheme for civil servants, the New Remuneration Scheme (NRS or SSB), and the introduction of an education system that would instil humanitarian values and create a disciplined and God-fearing generation. PAS pledged to enhance links between the people and their leaders through its concept of "leaders for the people and people together with leaders" to allow for greater community participation in decision-making.⁴

Presenting itself as the "Malay party", S46 made similar proposals in its 20-point manifesto, *Justice for All*. The party also promised the restoration of the supremacy of the Agung (King), the independence of the judiciary, the election of half the members of the Dewan Negara (Upper House or Senate), the abolition of numerous taxes and the introduction of subsidies to eliminate poverty by the year 2000, the promotion of health, education, and housing rights for all, the protection of minority rights, the enhancement of the status of women, and the control of the influx of foreign workers.

The DAP's main slogans at national level were *Full Liberalization for the Country* and *Save Malaysia from a One-Party State*, while its rallying calls in Penang were "Chief Minister with Power", "Try Us for 5 Years", "Don't Split Your Vote", and "Malaysian Malaysia". The DAP's manifestos also echoed several of the themes raised by all opposition parties, particularly the concentration of power in the hands of the executive (at the expense of the judiciary and the monarchies), the extent of corruption and wealth concentration among senior UMNO leaders, the extensive abuse of power by the BN through laws such as the ISA and the Land Acquisition Act, the abuse of the media and government machinery by the BN before and during the election campaign, and the nature of federal-state relations.

On the last point, discussion centred on the manner in which the BN government had abused its power at the federal level to victimize those states under opposition control. The DAP, however, later tried to play down this grievance in its attempt to secure the electoral support of Penangites. There was also a general appeal to the electorate to vote opposition to ensure that there were some checks and balances in Parliament and the state legislatures.

In Sabah, the PBS's main emphasis was to convince the electorate to use their votes to protest the manner in which the BN had gained control of the state government despite losing the state elections in early 1994. The party also argued that with the BN in control of the state, it was necessary to have a strong opposition in Parliament to ensure that the ruling coalition fulfilled its promises to Sabahans.⁵

Most parties also had supplementary manifestos for certain states. The BN, for example, promised the Kelantanese, among other things, a university in the state if it secured victory, while in Sabah, the ruling coalition highlighted the increase in Federal funding for state projects since it came to power. The DAP's supplementary manifesto for Penang — *Tanjong 3* — included pledges of a multi-racial state government and a state executive committee with a Malay Deputy Chief Minister and an Indian as a Senior State Exco member, a second university in the state, restoration of Municipal Council elections, and ensuring a favourable investment climate to sustain economic growth.

From the outset, the BN's main offensive against the opposition was that the latter's manifestos and campaign speeches were racial in nature. The BN claimed that the DAP's themes of a "Malaysian Malaysia" and a "Chief Minister with Power" carried strong racial innuendoes and appealed to racial sentiments which could jeopardize ethnic relations in the country. In the case of PAS, the BN alleged that the party had been distorting Islamic doctrine to split the Malay community to secure victory, while S46's emphasis on Malay nationalism was also depicted as being divisive. The BN further claimed that the PAS promise to establish an Islamic state and its campaign style also jeopardized communal harmony since it pitted Muslims against non-Muslims.⁶

Deputy Prime Minister Anwar warned the Penang electorate that the government would not support the state if it was led by the DAP since the BN would not co-operate with a party that incited racial tension.⁷ Not long after, Prime Minister Mahathir labelled the DAP's Malay candidates as "Ali Babas", claiming that they were allowing themselves to be used by non-*bumiputera* politicians to secure public office for themselves.⁸

The BN's campaign strategy, as usual, was far more effective and organized. UMNO workers, organized as *kepala sepuluh* (ten heads), were each responsible for monitoring ten households and working to secure the

support of those households which favoured the opposition. This was also an effective means for information gathering, keeping tabs on the mood of the electorate, and recognizing issues that needed to be dealt with by the candidates, for example during *ceramah* (political gatherings). This, however, was not always successful, which explained the BN's need to keep the campaign period short.⁹

Except in the case of PAS, in spite of the formidable challenge they faced, the other opposition parties' campaign strategies were disorganized, although most drew reasonable crowds of supporters and curious onlookers during their *ceramah*. When, for example, the DAP's Penang manifesto was released on the weekend before the election, it appeared that the alternative form of government the party was offering Penangites was hastily thought out and their campaign strategy lacked careful prior planning. The DAP's campaigning style in many of their *ceramah* featured theatrics, appealing very little to the minds of the electorate, although Penang has a high literacy rate and a significant middle class. In some states, particularly Perak and Negeri Sembilan, the DAP machinery was badly affected by party in-fighting, which resulted in some members campaigning for the ruling coalition.¹⁰

PAS, however, put together an organized party machinery and an effective campaign strategy, particularly in Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah. Relying strongly on Islamic rhetoric, the party was able to make a strong impact among the rural Malays, although its almost singular emphasis on Islam alienated non-Muslims. Similarly, S46's stress on its desire to protect Malay rights struck discordant chords among non-*bumiputera*. All this helped the BN cast the opposition parties in an unfavourable light in the media and in their own *ceramah* — claims and attacks which the opposition could not counter due to their severely limited access to the media. In the case of S46 in particular, its machinery outside Kelantan was so disorganized and badly run that it had little success in getting across rebuttals to allegations made by the BN.

Notes

1. This was stated by DAP's Deputy Secretary-General, P. Patto, during a discussion on 23 April 1995 in Penang.
2. K.J. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, *The Malaysian Parliamentary Election of 1964* (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1967).
3. *The Sun*, 7 May 1995.
4. *The Star*, 9 April 1995.
5. *The Star*, 13 April 1995.
6. *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, 20 April 1995.
7. *The Sun*, 15 April 1995.

8. *Utusan Malaysia*, 22 April 1995.
9. This was evident even in Mahathir's Kubang Pasu constituency. During a visit on 21 April 1995 to one of UMNO's operation rooms in the constituency, the campaign workers provided me with detailed information of the probable voting pattern in the areas under their jurisdiction. A daily monitoring of the mood of the electorate was undertaken to gather information on the issues which most concerned them. For example, after each *ceramah* by the opposition, the workers would gauge the important points that their BN parliamentary and state candidates would have to address to counter PAS' influence. Despite such an effective machinery, PAS seemed to be making some inroads into the constituency although the incumbent was the Prime Minister.
10. This view was voiced by a DAP candidate who had stood in Perak. The DAP's machinery in Penang, however, appeared rather efficient, because the party had concentrated much of its attention in the state. This meant that key party leaders, including Lim Kit Siang, Karpal Singh, and P. Pato, could not spend much time in constituencies outside Penang, which might have enabled the party to perform better elsewhere. This was another example of the benefits of a short campaign period for the BN.

III Results and Comments

The BN's Performance

In 1990, when the opposition had presented a strong challenge, the Barisan Nasional managed to win 127 of the 180 (or 70.5 per cent) parliamentary seats and just 253 of the 351 (or 72.1 per cent) state seats contested. In the 1995 General Elections, however, the ruling coalition lost only 30 parliamentary seats (securing 84.3 per cent of the seats) while increasing its share of state seats to 338, out of a total of 394 (or 85.8 per cent of the seats) (Tables 6 and 7).

In the Perlis and Johore state elections, the BN secured total control of both state assemblies. Prior to the election, though the ruling coalition controlled all the parliamentary seats in these two BN strongholds, the DAP had three seats and S46 one in the Johore state assembly. In the states of Penang, Perak, Negeri Sembilan, and Selangor, where the opposition enjoyed much support, the BN considerably reduced the number of parliamentary and state seats held by the DAP, while of the ten parliamentary constituencies in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, a traditional DAP stronghold, the BN secured victories in six (Tables 6 and 7); this was the first time that the BN had won more than half the total number of seats in Kuala Lumpur.

In Kedah, although the BN won all the parliamentary seats and wrested control of the DAP's sole state seat, it lost another state seat to PAS, giving the Islamic party two seats in the state assembly. In Malacca, where the DAP had hoped to make some in-roads following a number of issues that had cast doubt on the BN, the opposition struggled to retain its single parliamentary and three state seats.

In Kelantan, where the BN had been demolished in 1990, the ruling coalition managed to pick up two parliamentary seats and seven state seats, while in Terengganu, the BN won the sole parliamentary and two state seats held by S46, reduced PAS's representation in the state assembly from eight to seven, and limited its loss of parliamentary seats to PAS to one.

In Sarawak, the BN recorded a remarkable achievement, winning all but one of 27 parliamentary seats in contrast to its loss of six seats in the 1990

TABLE 6: MALAYSIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS, 1995
(1990 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS IN PARENTHESES)

State	Political Parties														
	BN		S46			PAS		DAP			PBS			Independent	
	C.	W.	C.	W.		C.	W.	C.	W.		C.	W.		C.	W.
Perlis	3	3	(2)	1	-	(-)	2	-	(-)	-	-	(-)	-	-	(-)
Kedah	15	15	(14)	6	-	(-)	9	-	(-)	-	-	(-)	-	-	(-)
Kelantan	14	2	(-)	8	6	(7)*	6	6	(6)	-	-	(-)	-	2	(-)
Terengganu	8	7	(6)	4	-	(1)	4	1	(1)	-	-	(-)	-	-	(-)
Penang	11	8	(5)	2	-	(-)	2	-	(-)	8	3	(6)	3	-	(-)
Perak	23	23	(19)	9	-	(-)	5	-	(-)	11	-	(4)	-	-	(-)
Pahang	11	11	(10)	6	-	(-)	3	-	(-)	2	-	(-)	-	3	(-)
Selangor	17	17	(11)	11	-	(-)	3	-	(-)	3	-	(3)	-	2	(-)
N. Sembilan	7	7	(7)	3	-	(-)	2	-	(-)	3	-	(-)	-	1	(-)
Kuala Lumpur	10	6	(3)	2	-	(-)	2	-	(-)	6	4	(4)	-	2	(-)
Sarawak	27	26	(21)	-	-	(-)	-	-	(-)	6	1	(2)	3	-	(4)
Sabah	20	12	(6)	-	-	(-)	1	-	(-)	4	-	(-)	20	8	(14)
Labuan	1	1	(1)	-	-	(-)	-	-	(-)	-	-	(-)	1	-	(-)
Malacca	5	4	(4)	2	-	(-)	3	-	(-)	2	1	(1)	-	-	(-)
Johore	20	20	(18)	11	-	(-)	4	-	(-)	5	-	(-)	1	-	(-)
Total		162	(127)		6	(8)		7	(7)		9	(20)		8	(14)

* One S46 parliamentarian later crossed over to the BN.

C Contested.

W Won.

SOURCES: *The Star*, 27 April 1995; *New Straits Times*, 27 April 1995; Khong (1991, p. 16).

TABLE 7: PENINSULAR MALAYSIAN STATE ELECTION RESULTS, 1995
(1990 STATE ELECTION RESULTS IN PARENTHESES)

State	Political Parties																
	BN		S46			PAS			DAP			PBS		Independent			
	C.	W.	C.	W.		C.	W.		C.	W.		C.	W.	C.	W.		
Perlis	15	15 (14)	5	-	(-)	10	-	(-)	-	-	(-)	-	-	(-)	-	-	(-)
Kedah	36	34 (26)	5	-	(-)	30	2	(1)	5	-	(-)	1	-	(-)	1	-	(-)
Kelantan	43	7 (-)	15	12	(14)*	27	24	(24)	-	-	(-)	-	-	(-)	2	-	(-)
Terengganu	32	25 (22)	12	-	(2)	18	7	(8)	-	-	(-)	-	-	(-)	-	-	(-)
Penang	33	32 (19)	4	-	(-)	7	-	(-)	26	1	(14)**	7	-	(-)	-	-	(-)
Perak	52	51 (34)	12	-	(-)	22	-	(-)	19	1	(12)	-	-	(-)	7	-	(-)
Pahang	38	37 (31)	16	-	(1)	17	-	(-)	7	1	(-)	-	-	(-)	4	-	(-)
Selangor	48	45 (35)	14	-	(1)	17	-	(-)	16	3	(6)	-	-	(-)	4	-	(-)
N. Sembilan	32	30 (24)	18	-	(-)	5	-	(-)	11	2	(4)	-	-	(-)	8	-	(-)
Malacca	25	22 (17)	7	-	(-)	17	-	(-)	9	3	(3)	-	-	(-)	-	-	(-)
Johore	40	40 (31)	23	-	(1)	7	-	(-)	10	-	(4)	1	-	(-)	4	-	(-)
Total		338 (253)		12	(19)		33	(33)		11	(45)		-	(-)		-	(-)

C Contested.

W Won.

* UMNO lost all the state seats in the 1990 Kelantan State Elections; two S46 state assemblymen later crossed over to the BN. This figure does not include the one seat won by Berjasa.

** The DAP lost one state seat to the BN in a by-election.

SOURCES: *The Star*, 27 April 1995; *New Straits Times*, 27 April 1995; Khong (1991, p. 19).

General Elections. In Sabah, however, although the ruling coalition won 12 of the 20 parliamentary seats, its victories were predominantly in Muslim-*bumiputera* areas, suggesting that the three new Kadazandusun parties in the Barisan Nasional had failed to wrest much of the community's support away from the PBS.

Compared to the 53.4 per cent electoral support enjoyed by the BN in 1990, in 1995 its proportion of popular support increased substantially — by almost 12 percentage points — to 65.05 per cent. In fact, in the 1995 General Elections the BN registered its most outstanding victory since the 1974 General Elections when the coalition secured 60.7 per cent of the popular vote. The BN's electoral victory was particularly significant since PAS was a member of the newly-formed ruling coalition during the 1974 General Elections. For Prime Minister Mahathir, the 1995 BN performance was even better than its 1982 General Election performance when he first led the coalition to an impressive victory, securing 60.5 per cent of the popular vote. Although the BN secured 84.3 per cent of the seats in Parliament in 1995, the coalition had won 85.7 per cent of the parliamentary seats in 1982, or 132 of the 154 parliamentary seats.

Performance of Opposition Parties

At both parliamentary and state levels, compared to the 1990 General Elections, the DAP's performance was abysmal. In the states of Perak and Selangor, where it enjoyed a great deal of support controlling four and three parliamentary seats respectively, the DAP lost all the parliamentary seats it contested. In Penang, where it held six parliamentary seats and focused its campaign, the DAP secured victories in only three constituencies. In two of these constituencies, Bagan and Jelutong, which were contested by party stalwarts P. Patto and Karpal Singh, their majorities were merely 118 and 283 votes respectively, although the number of non-Malays in each of these constituencies amounted to more than 77 per cent of the electorate. Lim Kit Siang's victory margin in the Tanjong constituency was slashed to 6,895 votes compared to his 17,469 majority in 1990, although non-Malays comprised almost 95 per cent of the electorate. In total, the DAP retained control of just nine (against 20) parliamentary seats, all of which, except for the Bintulu seat in Sarawak, were constituencies where Chinese comprised more than 64 per cent of the electorate, suggesting that the party had made no gains among *bumiputera* and had lost much non-*bumiputera* support. Four of these nine victories were achieved in constituencies in Kuala Lumpur, where the DAP has traditionally been well received (Table 6).

At the state level, the DAP's losses were more extensive — its 45 state seats in 1990 were reduced to a mere 11 seats (Table 7). In Penang, the party could only claim one seat — Batu Lintang, with a majority of merely 62

votes — while in 1990, it had almost captured control of the state by winning 14 of the 33 state seats. In Perak, the DAP's performance was equally grim; the party lost all its 13 seats, though it managed to win one seat previously held by the BN — the Sitiawan constituency. In Kedah and Johore, where the DAP held one and three seats respectively, the party lost representation in the state assemblies, while the BN halved the opposition party's representation from four to two in Negeri Sembilan and from six to three in Selangor.

In terms of total votes, the DAP lost a substantial 5.6 percentage points of electoral support, from the 17.7 per cent it registered in 1990 to only 12.1 per cent of the total votes cast, even though the party contested more seats in the 1995 General Elections. At the state level, the party obtained just 11.7 per cent of the popular vote compared to the 14.9 per cent it had secured in 1990.

The election results suggested that the electorate's acceptance of S46 was negligible in all states except Kelantan. The party only secured victories in parliamentary and state seats it contested in Kelantan although, of the opposition parties, it had nominated the most number of parliamentary candidates: 65 parliamentary and 130 state candidates contested seats in all states in the peninsula (Tables 2 and 3). It lost its sole representative in the Johore, Pahang, and Selangor state assemblies, and its one parliamentary and two state seats in Terengganu. In Kelantan, the two parliamentary seats lost by APU to the BN were those contested by S46, while of the seven state seats won by the BN, three were lost by S46 and one by Berjasa. Of the popular votes cast at parliamentary level, S46 secured just 10.1 per cent compared to the 14.4 per cent support it had obtained in 1990, while its support in the state elections fell to 7.5 per cent from 14.5 per cent in 1990. Even the party's most prominent parliamentary candidates outside Kelantan — S46 Deputy President and former federal minister Rais Yatim (who stood in Jelebu, Negeri Sembilan but lost narrowly by a margin of 1,107 votes), former federal minister and incumbent MP Abdul Manan Othman (who contested the Kuala Terengganu seat and lost by a majority of 4,852 votes), and Salleh Abas, the former Lord President (who was beaten in the Federal Territory constituency of Lembah Pantai by a majority of 13,359 votes) — failed to win.¹

PAS' performance outside Kelantan also appeared dismal. The party picked up only one additional state seat in Kedah, maintaining the total number of parliamentary seats it controlled at seven — six in Kelantan and one in Terengganu — and losing one state seat in Terengganu, thus reducing its representation in the state assembly to seven. The party also failed to win any parliamentary seat outside Kelantan and Terengganu although it had nominated 45 candidates to stand in all states except Sarawak. In the state elections, although PAS put up 178 candidates to contest seats in all states in

the peninsula, the party only won seats in the predominantly Malay states of Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah. In terms of popular votes, however, PAS registered an increase of 0.6 percentage points, thus securing 7.3 per cent support in the parliamentary elections compared to the 6.7 per cent it obtained in the 1990 General Elections. Of the total votes cast at state level, PAS won 13.5 per cent compared to the 12.2 per cent it secured in 1990. Although PAS contested only 30 parliamentary and 114 state seats in 1990, this was a commendable increase, considering the otherwise poorer performance of the opposition in this election.

Although PBS nominated three parliamentary candidates each in both Penang and Sarawak, and one each in Johore and Labuan, the party failed to make any impact outside Sabah, where it won eight of the 20 seats it contested. Despite winning 14 seats during the 1990 General Elections, following defections by PBS members to the BN in 1994 the party had only four Members of Parliament before the elections. The PBS' state-level candidates — seven in Penang and one each in Kedah and Johore — also fared very badly, losing their deposits in all cases. Though securing only 3.2 per cent of the popular vote during the election, and in spite of evidence that the PBS did not have much of a political future outside Sabah, the party's performance in Sabah was commendable; it won all seats where the non-Muslim *bumiputera* (usually Kadazandusun) together with the Chinese electorate outnumbered the Muslim-*bumiputera* electorate. In all four constituencies where the non-Muslim *bumiputera* formed the majority, the PBS was victorious. In the Chinese-majority constituencies of Gaya and Sandakan, where the BN won, both the PBS and DAP had fielded candidates, which split the votes enough to ensure victory for the ruling coalition. However, the PBS was successful in Tanjong Aru, another Chinese-majority area, although this was a three-cornered fight which also involved the DAP. The BN, however, obtained victories in all seats which had a Muslim-*bumiputera* majority, except Marudu, won by PBS's Amirkahar Mustapha, son of the late Muslim-*bumiputera* Chief Minister Mustapha Harun, who had previously held the seat. This suggested that despite the defections, the PBS still commanded significant support among the Kadazandusun and Chinese electorate in Sabah, and would continue to provide the BN keen opposition in the state. Jeffrey Kitingan and Bernard Dompok, formerly key Kadazan PBS leaders now in the BN, both lost to relatively junior PBS candidates, which indicated their lost credibility outside the PBS.² However, Yong Teck Lee, the former PBS Deputy President who had formed the Chinese-based Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP) that had been admitted into the BN, was still capable of garnering enough Chinese votes to win for the ruling coalition; the SAPP won two parliamentary seats in the elections.³

The Swing in Chinese Votes

Probably the most significant factor in the BN's overwhelming victory was the considerable support it drew from the non-*bumiputera*, especially Chinese. This is reflected in the BN's performance in the west coast states with significant Chinese populace, particularly Penang, Perak, Selangor, Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, and Johore and in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur (Table 8). In more than half (or almost 60 per cent) of the 58 constituencies where Chinese constituted more than 35 per cent of the electorate, the percentage point majority increase that the BN registered was in double-digit figures. In 27 constituencies, the percentage point increase in support for the BN was nearly or more than 15, with Pontian in Johore and Lumut in Perak registering an increase of 25 and 27 percentage points respectively! In seven of the eight constituencies in Penang, in ten of 11 in Perak, in four of five in Kuala Lumpur, and in all four constituencies in Selangor, all areas where the DAP had previously enjoyed huge backing, the BN recorded almost double-digit percentage point increases in support. In the urban areas of Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, Kedah, and Pahang, Chinese support for the BN also increased considerably. Only in one constituency, Cheras in Kuala Lumpur, did the BN's support diminish — by 6.5 percentage points. The results suggested that even among the traditionally more opposition-minded urban Chinese, anti-BN feelings had diminished sufficiently for them to vote in favour of the coalition.

In some constituencies, however, the impact of the redelineation exercise on voting patterns was obvious. In the Cheras constituency, the only Chinese-majority seat where the BN registered a decline in its support, there was a 25 percentage point increase in the number of Chinese in the constituency. In Ipoh Timur, which had been redelineated from the Ipoh constituency, and where there was a 19.6 percentage point increase in the Chinese electorate, the BN secured victory with a majority of merely 292 votes, which was an increase in voter support by only 8.8 percentage points. Similarly, there was a 13 percentage point increase in the Chinese electorate in the Kepong constituency in Kuala Lumpur, a traditional DAP stronghold that the party retained. In the Rasah constituency of Negeri Sembilan, where the DAP had a strong base, the Chinese electorate was increased by 12 percentage points while the increase in BN's popularity was by 6.8 percentage points. The Petaling Jaya constituency, where the Chinese were 59 per cent of the electorate, was divided into Petaling Jaya Utara, which had a Chinese majority of 76 per cent, and Petaling Jaya Selatan, where the Chinese comprised 50.5 per cent of the electorate. Though the BN won the Petaling Jaya Utara seat uncontested when the DAP's nomination was rejected, the opposition would probably have been victorious in the event of a contest; in Petaling Jaya Selatan, the BN won with a majority of 11,625

TABLE 8: DIFFERENCE IN SUPPORT RECEIVED BY THE BN IN
CONSTITUENCIES WHERE THE CHINESE ELECTORATE WAS MORE
THAN 33 PER CENT DURING THE 1990 AND 1995 GENERAL ELECTIONS
(Percentages)

State	Chinese % of Electorate, 1990	Chinese % of Electorate, 1995	1990	1995	Diff.
<i>Penang</i>					
Tanjong	86.6	87.0	29.6	40.7	11.1
Bukit Bendera	73.8	73.8	36.6	51.8	15.1
Bukit Mertajam	66.6	67.3	46.7	60.9	14.1
Jelutong	66.5	65.3	39.2	48.2	9.0
Bagan	62.5	64.4	45.9	48.7	2.8
Bayan Baru	66.2	64.3	46.6	54.5	7.8
Nibong Tebal	47.0	48.0	50.7	59.4	8.8
Balik Pulau	38.8	37.5	61.9	81.9	20.1
<i>Perak</i>					
Ipoh Timur	66.4	86.0	40.6	49.4	8.8
Batu Gajah	75.8	75.7	37.1	50.5	13.4
Ipoh Barat*	—	66.3	—	54.2	—
Kampar	74.9	61.2	48.1	65.6	17.5
Beruas	53.3	52.7	50.1	65.9	15.8
Gopeng	45.9	50.8	60.6	71.0	10.4
Taiping	55.0	47.8	49.2	65.8	16.6
Lumut	46.5	45.4	50.9	77.9	27.0
Telok Intan	45.4	45.1	51.5	65.5	13.9
Sungai Siput	46.0	43.7	51.4	69.9	18.5
Tapah	38.2	35.7	57.3	61.2	3.9
Tanjong Malim	36.1	34.4	70.4	81.1	10.7
<i>Johore</i>					
Senai	52.8	57.9	54.7	69.3	14.6
Bakri	55.0	55.1	52.5	60.5	8.0
Kluang	50.0	49.2	52.4	70.6	18.2
Gelang Patah*	—	49.2	—	72.1	—
Segamat	48.0	47.9	51.7	68.4	16.7
Pontian	46.0	46.9	58.4	83.4	25.0
Labis	46.0	45.4	56.6	69.8	13.2
Ledang	46.0	44.3	57.9	77.5	19.6
Batu Pahat	44.0	43.0	56.5	75.1	18.7
Johor Baru	39.7	40.0	56.8	77.2	20.4
Tenggara*	—	39.3	—	83.3	—
Muar	33.0	37.2	53.3	64.1	10.8
Parit Sulong	38.0	35.8	55.3	76.5	21.1
Pulai	40.9	35.8	60.8	80.7	19.9
Pagoh	29.0	35.3	70.8	74.5	3.7

TABLE 8 (cont'd): DIFFERENCE IN SUPPORT RECEIVED BY THE BN IN CONSTITUENCIES WHERE THE CHINESE ELECTORATE WAS MORE THAN 33 PER CENT DURING THE 1990 AND 1995 GENERAL ELECTIONS (Percentages)

State	Chinese % of Electorate, 1990	Chinese % of Electorate, 1995	1990	1995	Diff.
<i>Kuala Lumpur</i>					
Kepong	80.6	93.5	29.2	44.2	15.0
Seputeh	83.1	90.6	28.7	43.7	14.9
Cheras	59.0	84.1	40.0	33.5	-6.5
Bukit Bintang	83.5	79.5	20.8	41.5	20.7
Segambut*	-	52.6	-	65.9	-
Bandar Tun Razak*	-	40.1	-	67.1	-
Batu	39.8	39.8	57.2	68.6	11.4
Wangsa Maju*	-	37.3	-	78.7	-
<i>Selangor</i>					
Serdang	49.7	56.6	45.8	54.3	8.6
Klang	58.6	55.4	42.0	52.1	10.1
PJ Selatan*	-	50.5	-	61.3	-
Selayang	29.9	35.7	69.2	83.7	14.5
Ampang Jaya	16.4	34.3	58.7	76.0	17.3
<i>Negeri Sembilan</i>					
Rasah	48.5	60.0	51.4	58.1	6.8
Seremban	54.8	45.0	48.3	62.1	13.8
Telok Kemang	26.3	45.0	66.6	72.1	5.5
Jejebu	31.2	34.0	49.3	53.3	4.1
<i>Malacca</i>					
Kota Melaka	72.0	66.7	35.6	44.0	8.4
Batu Berendam	36.4	41.0	58.4	60.8	2.4
Selandar	36.3	34.3	66.4	84.4	18.0
<i>Pahang</i>					
Bentong	50.7	45.0	65.7	73.6	7.9
Raub	43.5	41.0	58.5	63.2	4.7
<i>Kedah</i>					
Alor Setar	39.7	46.0	54.3	68.6	14.3

* New parliamentary seats.

SOURCES: *New Straits Times*, 22 October 1990 and 27 April 1995; *Elections in Malaysia: Facts and Figures* (1994, pp. 109-18).

votes. This suggested that following the redelineation exercise in 1993 some areas became more pronounced opposition strongholds, which the ruling coalition were willing to write-off.

The urban Chinese swing to the ruling coalition was also reflected in the performance of the Chinese-based BN parties, particularly the MCA. In total, the party managed to win 101 of the 112 state and parliamentary seats it contested nationwide — 30 of 35 parliamentary seats and 71 of 77 state seats. In the 1990 General Elections, the MCA won only 18 (out of 32) parliamentary and 34 (out of 64) state seats. Even in Penang and Kuala Lumpur, where all the MCA candidates were defeated in the last general elections — the MCA had not won a seat in Kuala Lumpur since the 1982 General Elections — the party registered victories. The MCA's candidate won the newly-created Bandar Tun Razak parliamentary seat, while in Penang the MCA won all the nine state seats it contested, losing only one parliamentary seat. In contrast, in the previous general elections, the MCA was wiped out in Penang, while in the 1986 General Elections, it won only two state seats.

The Gerakan lost three of the ten parliamentary seats — two in Penang and one in Kuala Lumpur — and five of the 27 state seats it contested. In the 1990 General Elections, the Gerakan won five of the nine parliamentary seats, and 11 of the 22 state seats it contested. The historical, poorly-concealed animosity between the Gerakan and the MCA obviously had been temporarily resolved before the election, which worked in their favour, particularly in Penang and Kuala Lumpur. However, since this was probably a forced reconciliation insisted upon by UMNO before the general elections, it was unlikely that the cordial relations between both parties would prevail in the long term.⁴

Before the election, it appeared imperative that the BN secure the non-*bumiputera* vote in view of the growing influence of PAS among Malays, notably in the rural areas, which are traditional BN strongholds. With the Malay vote split between the BN and PAS, non-*bumiputera* support was required to counter the BN's expected losses in the Malay heartland states. The BN was also aware — from the results of previous elections — that its support from the urban non-*bumiputera*, especially the Chinese, was about equal to that received by the opposition. The decisive factor to enable the ruling coalition to secure victory was to obtain the support of fence-sitters, a group one daily described as the "30 per cent floating electorate".⁵ This, however, depended largely on the socio-political and economic factors prevailing in the country as well as the issues presented by the BN. A similar case in point was the 1982 General Elections, when the BN managed to secure an equally significant victory as a result of considerable Chinese support.

None the less, the BN had several factors favouring the possibility of a Chinese swing to the coalition. With economic growth rates of over eight per cent in the past seven years and with no indication that growth would taper off, virtual full employment resulting in wages rising appreciably, increased social mobility, and expanded business opportunities, there was a general feeling of contentment and satisfaction with the government, especially within urban communities. Apart from this, economic liberalization policies, especially Malaysia Incorporated, was well received by the Chinese. In contrast to the earlier New Economic Policy (NEP)'s pro-Malay bias, even non-*bumiputera* businessmen such as Vincent Tan Chee Yioun, T. Ananda Krishnan, Robert Tan Hua Choon, and Ting Pek Khing were awarded lucrative privatized government contracts.

In the cultural sphere, the government's increasing emphasis on the importance of the English language, the lifting of the restrictions on the lion dance, the introduction of the abacus in schools, and displays of greater inter-ethnic co-operation, reversed the growing alienation of many ethnic Chinese Malaysians. Prime Minister Mahathir's well-publicized long-term Vision 2020 plan for the country also captured the imagination of large numbers of Malaysians. In addition, Mahathir and his deputy, Anwar, both made well-publicized recent visits to China, an international conference on Confucianism-Islamic dialogue was convened in March 1995, there was heavy emphasis on increasing economic ties with China and India, while the Malaysian Government's criticisms of Western governments' admonishment of China's human rights record were given prominent coverage. The promotion of twinning programmes through private sector institutions considerably increased the access of non-*bumiputera* to higher education. Although not all these issues were well received by members of the Malay community, it appeared that the BN was willing to risk losing some Malay support, which was already spilt, to secure the non-*bumiputera* vote. In such an environment, where the government appeared to be making concessions in favour of the non-*bumiputera* rather than the Malays, it seemed to non-Malays that UMNO leaders were willing to take more liberal and conciliatory positions to foster greater multi-racialism without fearing that their positions would be jeopardized.

The BN's liberalization policies were so consequential that even the influential Chinese educationist movement, the Dong Jiao Zhong — comprising the United Chinese School Committees' Association (Dong Zhong) and the Chinese School Teachers' Association (Jiao Zhong) — which enjoys considerable support among the Chinese-educated, emphasized its non-partisan stand before the election. Since 1969, the movement had become such a crucial factor in Chinese politics that its endorsement was much sought after by Chinese-based parties, with the DAP usually the tacit

beneficiary of its support.⁶ The pronounced neutral stance of the Dong Jiao Zhong on this occasion was also attributable to the MCA's well-publicized efforts to promote education, especially Chinese education, in the country. The MCA managed to raise M\$50 million for its two main educational projects, the expansion of the Tunku Abdul Rahman (TAR) College and the Langkawi Project, initiated to raise funds to help the poor finance their education. The party later launched another educational fund to aid the development of the numerous independent Chinese secondary schools.⁷ During the 1982 General Elections, the Dong Jiao Zhong supported the BN when two of the movement's stalwarts, Kerk Choo Ting and Koh Tsu Koon (now Penang Chief Minister), decided to contest parliamentary seats — the president of the Jiao Zhong had then stated that "only by being represented in Parliament can Chinese educationalists play a more effective role"⁸ — with the result that the DAP registered significant electoral losses. During 1982 elections, the DAP won only two of the 27 state seats in Penang and just nine parliamentary seats nationwide. Subsequently, in the 1986 General Elections, at a time of great dissatisfaction among Chinese educationists over government policies, the DAP won 10 state seats in Penang and 24 parliamentary seats; in the process, the DAP's Lim Kit Siang defeated Koh Tsu Koon for the Tanjong parliamentary seat.

By the eve of the 1995 General Elections, it had become obvious that the anxiety of Chinese businessmen over the rapid emergence of influential and politically well-connected Malay millionaires, who were encroaching on Chinese control over the Malaysian corporate sector, had been mitigated by the rapidly growing economy and the economic liberalization measures introduced by the government. Furthermore, expanding business co-operation between non-*bumiputera* and Malay businessmen had garnered for the BN much favour from the Chinese business community. The Chinese had also warmed to the Prime Minister's suggestion that Malays should learn to speak Chinese in view of its commercial value.⁹

Just a few days before the election, the influential Malaysian Chinese Chamber of Commerce as well as its 17 affiliates gave their public endorsement to the ruling coalition, crediting the Prime Minister in particular for the economic dynamism of the country.¹⁰ It appeared that both the official expiration in 1990 of the twenty-year NEP (which had alienated much of the Chinese business community) and the government's post-1990 economic policies had attracted Chinese business backing for the BN. In 1990, S46 was believed to have received financial support from some corporate leaders¹¹ when the opposition Gagasan Rakyat coalition was led by former Finance Minister Razaleigh Hamzah who was known to have close links with Chinese businessmen; with S46 taking on a more Malay nationalist orientation in the 1995 election, such Chinese withdrew their support.

The badly flawed campaign strategy by the main Chinese opposition party, the DAP, also contributed to the swing in the Chinese vote. While the DAP recognized the favourable impact of the BN's policies on economic, educational, and cultural issues, the party stressed what it believed was the BN's "Achilles' heel" — namely the coalition's poor record on democracy. The DAP's call for full liberalization and real democracy failed, however, to capture the imagination of the Chinese electorate, affirming a widely-held view that the Malaysian Chinese community attaches greater importance to their cultural, educational, and economic rights rather than political rights. The BN, recognizing this trait and to woo Chinese votes, had implemented significant liberalization policies prior to the election. Thus, the DAP's campaign strategy to focus the debate on the contentious issue of power — with the DAP protesting against the concentration of power within UMNO, while the ruling coalition maintained its claim of power sharing — was not effective enough to pull Chinese support away from the BN. In fact, the BN had used a similar strategy to attract Chinese support in the Sabah state election held the previous year. By arguing that it was the Chinese community that would stand to gain most from federally funded development projects and by promising substantial financial assistance for the development of Chinese medium schools, the BN secured many votes from Chinese Sabahans, who had previously supported the PBS.

Another drawback in the DAP campaign was its inability to offer the electorate a credible package of alternative policies though it was making strident appeals to Penangites to give it the mandate to govern the state for the next five years. At the eleventh hour, a manifesto for Penang was hastily drawn up and distributed by the party. Entitled *Tanjong 3*, the manifesto merely outlined the changes that would be introduced if the DAP captured the state, particularly in the ethnic composition of the state government. This demonstrated a lack of preparedness on the part of the DAP since party leaders were presumably experienced enough to be aware of the electorate's generally conservative nature and hence should have anticipated that the electorate would be unlikely to vote for change if the latter felt that the incumbent BN government was performing well. Thus, the DAP's initial attempt to try to carry its campaign on the personality of its Secretary-General, Kit Siang, rather than at the level of issues, was also rather presumptuous. Although this tactic had proved successful in drawing Chinese support in previous elections, the DAP did not seem to heed the more recent trend among the electorate to vote for the party rather than the individual. The DAP's campaign style also occasionally appeared rather ill-conceived. When Mahathir suggested that Kit Siang's personality resembled that of the TV character "Robocop", the party responded by putting up numerous posters of the character in Penang, which only served to underline

the shallowness of the DAP's own campaign. When DAP leaders, including Kit Siang, publicly burnt issues of *The Star* newspaper during the campaign because they claimed that the daily carried distorted coverage of the party, the act apparently alienated some middle class voters.

The DAP's slogan, "Chief Minister with Power", may have backfired. It implied that the real power-holders in Penang were UMNO leaders and not Chief Minister Koh Tsu Koon as UMNO had the most number of state seats in Penang, and that this situation had emerged because a Chinese party had not been given a strong mandate. Instead, the Chinese gave their support to the MCA and Gerakan.¹² The slogan also appeared to alienate the Penang Malays, forcing the DAP to later claim that the most powerful political figure in Penang was not Deputy Chief Minister Ibrahim Saad but the Penang Gerakan leader and the island's municipal president Tan Gim Hwa! Such back-peddalling tactics further undermined the credibility of the DAP campaign.

The DAP's extremely poor performance in Penang is also probably attributable to the party's track record in the state for reputedly mediocre service. Complaints had emerged that many DAP assemblymen had not been actively servicing their constituencies, due in part to their over-confidence of continued electoral support. The party's prominent lawyer, Karpal Singh, for example, openly apologised for his limited involvement in his parliamentary constituency, citing his legal duties as the reason.¹³ Such poor servicing records also contributed to DAP assemblymen switching constituencies during elections, which upset many local party members who were overlooked as candidates in favour of more well-known figures.

The DAP also appeared to have lost the euphoria that had been generated in 1990 with the formation of the new opposition coalition, Gagasan Rakyat, which had a realistic hope of achieving power, particularly in Penang. The electorate was also aware that it had greater access to government aid in various forms by voting in a BN candidate at state level while selecting the opposition at parliamentary level. P. Patto, for example, won his Bagan parliamentary seats — albeit narrowly — but lost the state seat he contested, which fell within this constituency.¹⁴

The urban Chinese swing in votes also occurred in the capital cities of the predominantly Malay states of Kelantan (Kota Baru) and Terengganu (Kuala Terengganu). In the state constituencies of Kota Lama in Kelantan (contested by Berjasa), where the Chinese electorate constituted 39 per cent, and in Bandar in Terengganu (contested by PAS), which had a Chinese electorate of 38.3 per cent, the BN candidates — both from the MCA — managed to wrest the seats from APU. APU also lost the parliamentary constituency of Kuala Terengganu (12.2 per cent Chinese electorate), but managed to retain the Kota Baru seat (19 per cent Chinese electorate) with its majority more than halved — from 15,460 votes down to 6,268 votes.

Besides reduced Chinese support, a number of other factors may have contributed to APU's declining popularity in both these urban areas. In the Terengganu state constituency of Bandar, for example, for the 1990 General Elections, PAS managed to win with a slim majority of 726 votes in a four-cornered contest with the DAP splitting the Chinese votes by obtaining 1,519 votes. In the Kota Lama constituency (known as Padang Garong in 1990), although the Berjasa candidate had won with a majority of 2,739 votes, the DAP had split the votes by securing 2,156 votes. In the 1995 General Elections, although diminished co-operation among opposition parties facilitated the BN in both state seats, it was also obvious that APU's stress on Islam and Malay nationalism was rejected by the Chinese populace. While most APU leaders stressed substantive issues in their *ceramah*, other speakers tended to resort to rather communal issues, alienating the non-*bumiputera*.¹⁵

Another reason for the significant swing in Chinese votes in the west coast states was that the other major opposition party contesting against the BN was S46. Unlike in 1990, the S46 no longer offered credible alternative leadership for the country. The party was not well received even by urban Malays, although S46 leaders expounded the need to protect Malay cultural identity, which it claimed was threatened by the BN's cultural liberalization. S46 was defeated in all the 53 parliamentary and 104 state seats it contested in the west coast states and Pahang. The party also lost control of solitary seats it held in Johore, Selangor, and Pahang state assemblies, while its nomination of prominent candidates in urban constituencies, including in Lembah Pantai (former Lord President Salleh Abas) in Kuala Lumpur, Bagan Serai (former Cabinet member Zainal Abidin Zin) in Perak, Lipis (S46 Information Chief Ahmad Shabery Cheek) in Pahang, Sepang (former UMNO Youth leader Suhaimi Kamaruddin) in Selangor, and Jekebu (S46 Deputy President Rais Yatim) in Negeri Sembilan failed to make any impact. The election results indicated that while the non-*bumiputera* had been increasingly alienated by S46's emphasis on Malay concerns, even the *bumiputera* in the west coast failed to respond strongly to the party's call for the protection of Malay rights. This suggests that neither the DAP nor S46 represented viable political alternatives for the urban, especially middle class, electorate.

The Malay Split

Since the *bumiputera* in the Malay heartland states of Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu continued to be divided, UMNO faced the prospect of losing further ground in the general election. Kelantan had already fallen to PAS in the previous general election and UMNO seemed less able to consolidate the Malay vote. The BN's eroding support was primarily attributable to the

perception of Malays in these states of the impact of rapid economic development and modernization on the community. Many rural Malays appeared to be of the view that they had benefited little from the BN government's strong emphasis on urban capitalist industrialization and modernization. Some felt that the economic environment that was being created by the BN was not only alien but hostile to rural Malay interests and well being.¹⁶ There also appeared to be growing frustration among rural Malays that government policies were augmenting social differentiation and economic disparities in the community.

Rural Malays also appeared distressed with the absorption of Western values and lifestyles, which went against Malay values and Islamic beliefs. The spread of numerous social ills — teenage promiscuity and vagrancy, drug addiction, and increased divorce — among Malays was attributed to newly imbibed materialist tendencies and preoccupations with pursuing wealth at the expense of family life. In such an alienating and highly competitive environment, many felt the need to preserve traditional lifestyles with their emphasis on traditional Malay and Islamic values. Though conservative and even reactionary in parts, the appeal for a return to Islamic values, as espoused by PAS, continued to have strong impact on rural Malays, especially in the north, though PAS also appeared to gather pockets of support in urban areas.¹⁷

PAS sought to convince the Malay electorate that the social ills of *bohsia* (teenage promiscuity and immoral activities), *lepak* (loitering in public places), and drug addiction were not the roots, but the consequences, of the problem; at the root of it, they argued, was a profound moral and spiritual crisis facing the Malays. This surge of decadent materialism, at the expense of spiritual and moral values, encouraged the turn to religion for support and guidance. One PAS leader described it thus: "Religion and spiritual matters are taking a back seat while feverish efforts were made to advance in the physical and material planes."¹⁸ For PAS, Islamic values could be applied to all aspects of society, be they social, economic, or political.¹⁹ So effective was PAS' rhetoric that even before Parliament was dissolved, the party managed to put UMNO on the defensive, necessitating the convening of a special assembly of UMNO members to publicly denounce PAS' interpretation of Islam.

The election results suggest that PAS' emphasis on Islam had a greater impact on the electorate than S46's focus on Malay nationalism. Apart from this, the support that S46 retains among Malays, particularly those in Kelantan, is also believed to be related to Razaleigh's royal connections. In the case of PAS, however, under the leadership of the Kelantan state government by Menteri Besar Nik Aziz Nik Mat, the highly-respected *ulama* (religious teacher) popularly known as "To' Guru", the party had proven its capability to rule despite UMNO's insistence in 1990 that the Islamic party's

governance of Kelantan would result in a chaotic administration. In addition, particularly from the viewpoint of Malays, under PAS' leadership, the state government had implemented measures to curb activities they considered immoral, such as gambling and alcohol consumption, had ensured relatively smooth operation of the state bureaucracy despite reduced federal funding, and had maintained an open, accessible, and transparent administration.

S46's disappointing performance in the election was also attributable to its poor party machinery and party morale, while PAS' campaign, inspired by religious fervour, was better organized with its workers displaying great commitment and vigour. This was reflected in the election results in the parliamentary seats of Kedah and Terengganu. Although APU as a whole appeared to gain ground at the expense of the BN, this was mainly due to PAS, as the performance of S46 candidates generally deteriorated (Table 9).

In Kedah's 14 parliamentary constituencies — all won by the BN — a comparison of the 1990 and 1995 election results reveals that the ruling coalition suffered reduced majorities in eight areas while the increase in its majorities was below 2 percentage points in two other seats and below 7 percentage points in another two. In the two constituencies where the BN registered a significant increase in its victory margin, the percentage of the non-Malay electorate was high — 53.2 per cent (in Alor Setar) and 42.2 per cent (in Sungai Petani). In fact, even in three of the four other constituencies where the BN registered an increase in popular votes, the non-Malay electorate was high — Merbok (42.6 per cent), Padang Serai (41.7 per cent), and Kulim-Bandar Baru (30.3 per cent). The trend in this northern state also indicates that while the BN managed to augment its support among the non-*bumiputera*, it lost some ground among Malays.

All eight of the constituencies where the BN suffered reduced majorities were contested by PAS, while in the one other constituency contested by the Islamic party, the BN's winning margin increased by a mere 0.2 percentage points. However, the margin of loss of S46's five candidates increased substantially — by more than 14 percentage points in two cases and by more than five percentage points in two other cases; all the seats contested by S46 had Chinese electorates of more than 30 per cent. In the new seat of Langkawi contested by S46, where the Malay electorate amounted to more than 91.2 per cent, the party only managed to obtain 22.9 per cent of the votes. The voting trend indicates PAS' increased popularity in Kedah, while S46's performance showed an appreciable decline, possibly primarily due to reduced Chinese support, though its Malay support also appeared to be declining.

In all the parliamentary seats contested by PAS in Terengganu, the Islamic party managed to improve on its 1990 performance; there was, however, a decline in the Marang constituency, which the party retained. S46 bettered its performances in two of the four constituencies it contested, but

TABLE 9: DIFFERENCE IN MARGIN OF SUPPORT RECEIVED BY BN
OVER PAS AND S46 IN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES IN KEDAH,
TERENGGANU, AND KELANTAN DURING THE 1990 AND 1995
GENERAL ELECTIONS
(Percentages)

State	APU Party Contesting	Seat Won By	Share of Votes 1990	1995	Percentage Point Difference
<i>Kedah</i>					
Baling	PAS	BN	61.4	55.7	-5.7
Sik	PAS	BN	59.4	53.6	-5.8
Jerlun	PAS	BN	59.5	53.9	-5.6
Padang Terap	PAS	BN	58.4	54.4	-4.0
Pendang	PAS	BN	52.9	51.0	-1.9
Yan	PAS	BN	57.2	55.7	-1.5
Kubang Pasu	PAS	BN	75.4	74.2	-1.2
Kuala Kedah	PAS	BN	52.8	52.3	-0.5
Pokok Sena	PAS	BN	53.8	54.0	0.2
Kulim-Bandar Baru*	S46	BN	68.7	69.9	1.2
Merbok*	S46	BN	68.4	74.2	5.8
Padang Serai*	S46	BN	58.8	65.6	6.8
Sungai Petani*	S46	BN	60.7	75.8	15.1
Alor Setar*	S46	BN	54.3	68.6	14.3
Langkawi*	S46	BN	-	77.1	-
<i>Terengganu</i>					
Kemaman	S46	BN	62.6	57.6	-5.0
Kuala Nerus	S46	BN	53.6	51.5	-2.1
Besut	S46	BN	50.4	54.6	4.2
Kuala Terengganu	S46	BN	45.3	53.5	8.2
Dungun	PAS	BN	54.0	50.5	-3.5
Marang	PAS	PAS	48.2	47.6	-0.6
Hulu Terengganu	PAS	BN	53.1	52.5	-0.6
Setiu	PAS	BN	55.7	55.5	-0.2
<i>Kelantan</i>					
Tumpat	PAS	PAS	33.1	46.1	13.0
Pengkalan Chepa	PAS	PAS	26.1	29.6	3.5
Rantau Panjang	PAS	PAS	38.1	40.4	2.3
Kubang Kerian*	PAS	PAS	-	33.5	-
Bachok	PAS	PAS	32.8	42.0	9.2
Kuala Krai	PAS	PAS	30.8	42.5	11.7
Kota Baru	S46	S46	29.3	41.6	12.3
Pasir Mas	S46	PAS	33.9	44.3	10.4
Peringat*	S46	BN	35.3	50.5	15.2
Tanah Merah	S46	S46	33.7	46.9	13.2

TABLE 9 (cont'd): DIFFERENCE IN MARGIN OF SUPPORT RECEIVED BY BN OVER PAS AND S46 IN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES IN KEDAH, TERENGGANU, AND KELANTAN DURING THE 1990 AND 1995 GENERAL ELECTIONS
(Percentages)

State	APU Party Contesting	Seat Won By	Share of Votes 1990	1995	Percentage Point Difference
<i>Kelantan (cont'd)</i>					
Pasir Puteh	S46	S46	35.0	44.1	9.1
Machang	S46	S46	32.6	43.4	10.8
Jeli ^a	S46	BN	—	51.1	—
Gua Musang ^a	S46	S46	22.7	(21.9)	-0.8

a. Areas where the Chinese constituted more than 20 per cent of the electorate.

b. New seat won by the BN.

c. New seat won by PAS.

d. The BN's nomination for this seat was rejected; the AKIM candidate was later supported by the BN.

SOURCES: *New Straits Times*, 27 April 1995; *Elections in Malaysia: Facts and Figures* (1994, pp. 109-12).

lost its sole seat in the state, Kuala Terengganu, to the BN. In one of the constituencies where S46 improved on its performance (Kuala Nerus), UMNO members in the area were deeply factionalized.

The BN's performance in Terengganu was not particularly noteworthy, although the coalition conceded only one constituency (Marang) to PAS. Of the eight parliamentary constituencies in the state, the BN only managed to improve its performance in two areas, Kuala Terengganu and Besut; in Kuala Terengganu, it is probable that the BN secured the backing of many more Chinese who comprised 12.5 per cent of the electorate. In five of the seven constituencies in which the BN registered victory, the support it received did not exceed 55 per cent; for the two others, it received 55.5 per cent in one instance, and 57.6 per cent in the other (Table 9). The almost even support received by the BN and APU in all eight parliamentary constituencies was another indication of the split within the Malay electorate in the state. Thus, despite only registering the loss of a single parliamentary seat in Terengganu, the BN's support within the state had diminished.

This division among the Malay electorate was also manifested in the voting pattern at the state level in Terengganu and Kedah. In Terengganu, the number of constituencies under BN control grew by three, from 22 to 25. S46 lost its only two state seats, and PAS lost one seat, reducing the APU presence in the state assembly to seven. Although the BN won two seats uncontested when the nomination papers of the candidates were rejected, the

BN's majority in nine of these 25 seats was less than 1,000 votes, while in seven other constituencies its majority was smaller than 2,000 votes. Of the nine seats where APU's losing margin was less than 1,000 votes, seven were contested by PAS. This meant that a slight swing in favour of the opposition would have been sufficient for APU to form the state government. Of the seven seats won by PAS, however, the majorities in four constituencies were less than 500 votes, while its majorities in the other three seats did not exceed 1,400 votes.

Of Kedah's 36 state seats, the BN lost two seats to PAS; the Islamic party had won only one seat in the 1990 elections. The BN's majorities in five constituencies were less than 1,000 votes each and in five other constituencies were less than 2,000 votes each; all these ten seats were contested by PAS. One of the two seats won by PAS, however, was won with a majority of only 196 votes. Of the five seats contested by S46, the margin of losses in four were by more than 5,000 votes. In the 1990 General Elections, of the 28 state seats in Kedah, the BN only lost two seats by less than 1,000 votes and five seats by less than 2,000 votes, while its majority in 18 other seats ranged from 3,000 and 11,000 votes. In terms of the popular vote, PAS secured 31.5 per cent of the votes in the seats contested at state level, an increase of 7.9 percentage points from its performance at the 1990 General Elections. At parliamentary level, PAS obtained 24.9 per cent of the votes, an increase of 9 percentage points from the previous general election.²⁰

Even in the state of Kelantan, there was a discernible decline in S46's performance. While PAS managed to win all of the six parliamentary seats where its candidates were fielded, S46 lost two of the eight seats it contested. The BN's majorities, however, were merely 572 in the Jeli constituency and 1,935 in the Peringat constituency, both contested by prominent members of Mahathir's Cabinet. Of the six constituencies contested and won by PAS, the BN's percentage of the vote ranged from 29.6 to 42.5 per cent in all instances except one, where the BN secured 46.1 per cent of the vote. However, in the case of all the constituencies contested by S46, except for Gua Musang — where the incumbent was party president Razaleigh Hamzah and where the BN's nomination had been rejected — the BN's range of support was between 41.6 per cent and 51.1 per cent. The increase in support received by the BN between 1990 and 1995 in constituencies contested by PAS ranged between 2.3 and 12.9 percentage points, while in seats contested by S46 — excluding Gua Musang — the range was between 9.1 and 15.1 percentage points (Table 9). Only in three of the 14 parliamentary seats was the percentage of support received by the BN less than 34 per cent, indicating how more evenly split the Malay electorate was in the state in 1995. This suggests diminishing support for S46 while PAS continues to retain most of its support.

In the Kelantan state elections, PAS and S46 each lost three seats, while Berjasa lost the other seat to the BN. The BN's majorities in four of these

seven seats, however, were less than 600 votes, and in three other seats, less than 1,850 votes. Four of the BN's state seats are within the parliamentary constituencies of Peringat and Jeli, which the ruling coalition narrowly won. In another state seat won by the BN, Kota Lama, the Chinese electorate constituted 39 per cent. In the case of the APU component parties, five of the 12 seats won by S46 were secured with majorities of less than 1,000 votes, and in four other constituencies, the party's majorities were less than 2,000 votes; the BN reduced S46 support in all seats, except one. Of the 24 seats PAS retained, five were won with majorities of less than 1,000 votes, while nine others were secured with majorities of less than 2,000 votes.

One cause of the BN's declining popularity in some constituencies in the Malay heartland states was the problem of factionalism in UMNO. In Kedah, both Prime Minister Mahathir and Mentri Besar Osman Aroff admitted that internal bickering and limited co-operation among UMNO members had contributed to the declining BN support.²¹ Some members protested silently by refusing to support UMNO candidates, closing down operations rooms, declining to participate in *ceramah*, and secretly helping opposition candidates.²² Following the elections, nearly 3,000 UMNO members were referred to the party's disciplinary committee for investigation. By early June 1995, after reviewing less than a thousand cases, UMNO had already expelled 53 members, eight others faced indefinite expulsion, while disciplinary action was taken against 34 others for acting against the party's interests during the election.²³ This does not include the sacking of those who contested the election as independent candidates.

The 4Ms

Other major factors contributed to the BN's sweeping electoral victory. The "3Ms" — Money, Media, and Machinery — have long been credited for the BN's previous election victories. However, during the 1995 elections, there was another "M" factor — namely Mahathir himself. The Prime Minister's greatly increased personal popularity since the late 1980s was apparent among the Chinese. Mahathir's agenda for the future of Malaysia captured in his "Vision 2020" slogan, appeared to have won over many west coast urban Malaysians. His government's liberalization policies particularly attracted many non-Malays to vote for his continued premiership. However, the prominence given by PAS to moral decay in society, and the mixed benefits of rapid economic growth discouraged many Malays from subscribing to Mahathir's developmentalist priorities for the country.

During the campaign period, in view of the BN's control over federal funds, senior government leaders were shown presenting state support for public projects. For example, on 12 April 1995, after the dissolution of Parliament and before Nomination Day, while opening the annex of the Chan Wa Secondary School in Seremban where his party expected to face a tough

contest with the DAP, MCA President Ling Liong Sik admitted that he had been "given the (government) approval on April 10" (after Parliament had been dissolved) to "help the school grow".²⁴ While campaigning in his Sungei Siput constituency in Perak, MIC President S. Samy Vellu presented the Sey Wah primary school with a government cheque for M\$56,000 to construct a new school wing.²⁵ Other senior BN leaders officiated at major projects which required government funding. For example, Prime Minister Mahathir launched the Terengganu Second Phase Development Programme (1995–2010) on 20 April 1995;²⁶ the next day, he also launched the construction of an indoor stadium in Penang worth M\$96 million.²⁷

There was much opposition dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the BN machinery. The opposition claimed that the BN's expenditure in a number of constituencies during the campaign far exceeded the stipulated maximum of M\$50,000 for a parliamentary constituency and M\$30,000 for a state seat. The opposition also alleged that funds and gifts had been distributed by the BN to secure votes. These allegations were made primarily in the predominantly Malay states of Kelantan and Terengganu, although they also arose in Kedah and in some urban constituencies in Perak and Kuala Lumpur.²⁸ In Kelantan, for example, PAS alleged that there were candidates who spent almost M\$5 million to ensure support, with voters paid between M\$500 and M\$1,000 each.²⁹ Later, PAS filed a case in court to protest the BN's use of money to buy support and alleging irregularities in the conduct of the postal votes in the Jeli and Peringat constituencies and some of the state constituencies within these two parliamentary constituencies. The case, however, was dismissed on the grounds that PAS had not provided sufficient evidence to prove that vote buying had occurred and that there were irregularities in the postal votes.³⁰ In the Batu constituency in Kuala Lumpur, a police report filed by the PRM against the BN candidate for overspending during his campaign is still under investigation.

In Kelantan, the APU coalition attributed the BN's inroads into the state to the preceding redelineation exercise favouring UMNO.³¹ For example, Razaleigh attributed the BN's parliamentary victories in the Peringat and Jeli constituencies to postal votes from resident military encampments following the redelineation exercise in 1993.³² Apart from this, the redelineation exercise managed to split APU support in several constituencies. The opposition also contended that the redelineation exercise benefited Anuar Musa's Peringat constituency with the transfer of a large number of UMNO supporters when the Kok Lanas parliamentary constituency was reconstituted.³³ In Penang, the DAP claimed that the unexplained massive transfer of voters' names in certain state constituencies, especially in Tanjung Bunga and Kebun Bunga, contributed to the party's loss of these two crucial state seats.³⁴

APU also felt that the BN had abused its prerogative in deciding the date of the election by dissolving Parliament during the annual *haj* period when Muslims make their pilgrimage to Mecca. One paper estimated that almost 19,000 Muslims would be out of the country performing the *haj* during the election.³⁵ APU claimed that the reduced majority for the opposition coalition in some constituencies was due to reduced voter turnout due to Muslims performing the *haj*. The voter turnout in Kelantan was only 60 per cent, compared to 70 per cent in October 1990 when elections were last held.

The indirect and direct control by some of the Barisan Nasional component parties over the private media — the private television network, TV3, and the major Malay, Chinese, Tamil, and English newspapers — and the government's direct control over the electronic media — TV1, TV2, and the radio networks — were sources of unhappiness on the part of the opposition. The latter repeatedly complained that in most instances they were unable to get their views on issues published. In some instances, their statements were taken out of context, while in others, stories were carried which were allegedly not true.³⁶ The major newspapers were also used to carry full page — usually coloured — advertisements on the BN's accomplishments. Lampoons and cartoon caricatures of opposition leaders were also daily fare and usually given full page prominence. The papers repeatedly insinuated that there was some form of covert co-operation between PAS and the DAP despite denials to the contrary by both parties.

For much of the campaign period, it seemed that a major feud had erupted between the opposition and the main newspapers and TV3, with the opposition consistently painted in a very negative light as the friction between the two intensified. The presence of morning TV for the first time before and during a general election was also well utilized to capture support through numerous talk shows and other programmes for the BN. Documentaries and talk shows led by ostensibly independent analysts were also aired daily by the networks at prime time and generally painted a favourable picture of the BN and presented unfavourable images of the opposition. Following the election, both S46's Razaleigh and DAP's Kit Siang attributed their parties' poor performances to "a media blackout" and the one-sided support given by the media to the BN.³⁷

Notes

1. S46 also fielded two nieces of the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in the Kedah parliamentary seats of Alor Setar (Tunku Sofiah Mohd Jewa) and Merbok (Tengku Maheran Mukhtar); both women lost by majorities of over 15,000 votes.
2. In fact, the parties led by defectors from PBS all fared badly: the Angkatan Keadilan Rakyat Bersatu (Akar, or the United People's Justice Movement),

- which Jeffrey Kitingan joined, lost its bid to win the Bandau and Tuaran parliamentary constituencies. The Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS, or United Sabah People's Party), headed by Joseph Kurup, lost both the Keningau and Tenom constituencies. Parti Demokratik Sabah (PDS, or Sabah Democratic Party), led by Bernard Dompok, lost the Penampang and Kinabalu seats (*New Straits Times*, 14 May 1995).
3. Of the remaining 10 constituencies where the BN secured victory, nine were won by UMNO (out of 10), while the other Chinese-based Sabahan party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), won the sole seat it contested in the election (*New Straits Times*, 27 April 1995).
 4. Since Gerakan has basically drawn disgruntled ex-MCA members, there has always been much animosity between the two parties. Gerakan President Lim Kheng Yaik, and other party leaders, including Alex Lee, were once MCA leaders.
 5. See *New Straits Times*, 16 April 1995.
 6. *New Straits Times*, 15 April 1995.
 7. *New Straits Times*, 9 April 1995.
 8. Diane Mauzy, "The 1982 General Elections in Malaysia: A Mandate for Change?", *Asian Survey* 23, no. 4 (1983): 507.
 9. *New Straits Times*, 15 April 1995.
 10. See *Nanyang Siang Pau*, 23 April 1995.
 11. Information was provided by a S46 leader.
 12. The post of Deputy Chief Minister was created soon after the 1990 General Elections, when Koh was appointed Chief Minister to replace his long-standing predecessor, Lim Chong Eu, who had been defeated by Kit Siang. The creation of the new post, the DAP suggested, indicated that Koh was not in charge. The DAP pointed out that Koh was not a senior party leader in the Gerakan, and that the main reason he was appointed Chief Minister was to ensure that the influential Goh Cheng Teik, who had once challenged Lim Kheng Yaik for the Gerakan presidency, would not be able to use the post to develop his power base.
 13. These comments were made by Karpal Singh during a DAP *ceramah* in Penang on 22 April 1995. A number of Penangites had mentioned to me that although they recognized the important role played by the DAP as part of the opposition, the limited availability of their state representatives was one reason for dissatisfaction with the party.
 14. During my visit on 23 April 1995 to the Prai area in the Bagan constituency, a number of people openly stated that despite the unfulfilled promises of the incumbent BN assemblyman, they were also aware that it was unlikely that a DAP representative in the state legislature would be able to secure government approval for land titles, better housing, and other social and economic needs of the community.
 15. During a *ceramah* I attended on 19 April 1995 in the Bandar state constituency in Kuala Terengganu, the PAS candidate, Mustapha Ali, made a rather persuasive appeal to his audience for support to ensure that the mismanagement and abuse of power within the BN state government would be checked. One secondary speaker, however, stressed that the reason for the

- rejection of PAS' *hudud* legislation was that only two of the 14 leaders of component parties in the BN were Muslims. Another suggested that since the BN candidate in the constituency was a Chinese and a non-Muslim, he should be rejected for being a *kafir* (infidel or non-believer).
16. Information obtained from discussions with members of the Malay electorate in Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah. Generally, I found that most rural Malays tended to hold similar opinions on the government's development projects.
 17. It was interesting that these sentiments were voiced by a number of Muslims in both urban and rural Kelantan. On two different occasions, two men, both well-educated and in one case a businessman, referred to themselves as "born-again Muslims", claiming that they had found new meaning in life through Islam after realizing that their environments did not help preserve or inspire the desire to lead more moral and purposeful lives.
 18. *New Straits Times*, 6 April 1995.
 19. This point was repeatedly stressed by the PAS leader and Menteri Besar of Kelantan, Nik Aziz Nik Mat, during his *ceramah* at Kampung Puah Lima, near Melor in Kelantan on 20 April 1995. He claimed that it was the role of the government to protect the people from vices which had corrupting influence on them.
 20. *New Straits Times*, 10 May 1995.
 21. *New Straits Times*, 10 May 1995.
 22. Halim Arshad, the PAS Secretary-General from Kedah, also claimed that his party had received the support of disgruntled UMNO members in the campaign. The discussion with Halim was held on 22 April 1995 in Alor Setar.
 23. *The Star*, 12 June 1995.
 24. *The Star*, 13 April 1995.
 25. *The Star*, 22 April 1995.
 26. *New Straits Times*, 19 April 1995 and 21 April 1995.
 27. *Berita Harian*, 22 April 1995.
 28. Following the general election, one member of the Lembah Pantai constituency in Kuala Lumpur filed a case in court alleging that the BN candidate who won the seat had obtained voter support by distributing "gifts". One key allegation was that the candidate, Shahrizat Ali, had benefited from an offer made by Kuala Lumpur City Hall — through its Mayor — to sell land titles at a reduced price — from M\$4 per sq. ft. to M\$2.60 per sq.ft. — to those occupying an area in the constituency. While Shahrizat admitted in court that the offer had been made in her presence during a *ceramah*, she also claimed that she had no prior knowledge of the Mayor's intention to make the offer (*New Straits Times*, 2 September 1995).
 29. *Harakah*, 8 May 1995.
 30. *New Straits Times*, 4 September 1995.
 31. See *The Sun*, 29 April 1995.
 32. *The Sun*, 29 April 1995.
 33. See *New Straits Times*, 23 April 1995.
 34. *The Star*, 12 April 1995; *New Straits Times*, 17 April 1995.
 35. See *The Star*, 26 February 1995.

36. The DAP's Dr. Tan Seng Giaw, for example, claimed that *Utusan Malaysia's* front-page story on him on 22 April 1995 was a total fabrication. *Utusan Malaysia* reported that Seng Giaw had stated that the DAP was deeply factionalized due to dissatisfaction with Kit Siang's leadership. The paper also reported Seng Giaw's desire to leave the DAP to concentrate on his medical practice because, the *Utusan Malaysia* quoted him as saying, "I want to make more money by being a doctor." Seng Giaw made this denial during a seminar entitled The 1995 General Elections: Its Conduct and Implications, organized by the University of Malaya on 18 May 1995.
37. See *The Sun*, 29 April 1995.

IV The Aftermath

More Multi-Racial Politics?

Since the election results indicate that rural Malays are deeply divided electorally, which suggests that UMNO can no longer depend on their full support, the government may be compelled to adopt policies and proposals which are more multi-racial in their orientation. Furthermore, given the growing economy and increasing urbanization, the swiftly expanding urban Malays are becoming increasingly important electorally compared to the diminishing rural peasantry. As the Malay middle class grows more secure economically and politically, and as younger Malaysians acquire a less communal outlook, there may be greater desire for the promotion of a more multi-ethnic orientation to politics as opposed to the ethnocentric nature of politics and policies which have dominated since the late 1960s.

The non-bumiputera support secured by the BN and the split among the *bumiputera* is also reflected in the *bumiputera* domination of the opposition for the first time since 1964 — of the 30 opposition members, only nine, all from the DAP, are non-*bumiputera*. Following the election, a major issue of contention among the opposition was whether, given the greater number of *bumiputera* in the opposition, the DAP's Lim Kit Siang should continue as opposition leader.¹

In Kelantan, however, the pattern of voting suggests that the BN will not be able to loosen APU's grip on the state's electorate too easily. For the time being at least, PAS seems to have made modest gains in its battle with UMNO in Kelantan and the northern Malay heartland states. This may be seen in terms of the ideological struggle between UMNO's liberal modernist interpretation of Islam and the more traditional and fundamentalist interpretation offered by PAS, a struggle won by the latter, though this does seem to reduce the complex mechanisms behind voting behaviour to simplistic terms.

Although PAS remains UMNO's biggest threat, the Islamic party's domain of influence will probably remain limited to Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Upper Perak, and parts of Perlis and perhaps Penang, unless the party

collaborates with the Chinese-based opposition parties. This is improbable given that PAS has no intention of abandoning its stated goal of transforming Malaysia into an Islamic state, although the party is also aware that it is virtually impossible for it to achieve power on its own. Even within APU, it is questionable if PAS and S46 will be able to sustain their co-operation in the long run, particularly due to their ideological differences and the apparent incompatibility between members of these parties in terms of political orientation and lifestyles.

Among the urban middle class, particularly the Chinese, although they might shift their support to the opposition if the economy takes a downturn or if liberalization stalls or is reversed, the fact remains that the opposition political parties do not present themselves as viable alternatives. It is doubtful that the DAP will be able to make any inroads among the Malays, even where the community is fragmented. Since it is basically viewed as a Chinese party and in light of its inability to sustain a working relationship with S46 in the Gagasan Rakyat, the DAP will find it difficult to attract even urban Malay support without incorporating some major changes to its political philosophy. Even if the DAP does present a viable alternative for the urban, middle class electorate, many young, educated Chinese may soon come to be more comfortable with the BN and find some multi-ethnic co-operation within the ruling coalition preferable to the DAP.

S46's emphasis on the restoration of "Malay rights", its failure to sustain multi-ethnic opposition co-operation through the Gagasan Rakyat, and its dependence on PAS to survive in Kelantan suggests that the party's credibility and acceptance among the electorate is dwindling. Its declining support in the Malay heartland, despite its Malay rhetoric, and its failure to obtain support in the west coast of the peninsula suggest that the influence of S46 may soon be limited to Kelantan.

The election results suggest that parties such as the DAP, S46, and PRM may have to review their ideological bases if they hope to make an impact among the electorate and move beyond a position of capturing mainly protest votes. The success of the PAS campaign, however, has suggested that an ideology based on religion can function effectively as the organizing principle, especially in a context where rapid modernization has undermined aspects of societal and individual well-being. However, in the predominantly multi-racial, multi-religious west coast of the peninsula, it is unlikely that the opposition can rely on an ideology based on religion as an effective means to mobilize and sustain support.

Thus, ironically, the only party that can still play a unifying role among the opposition is S46. Since Razaleigh is still seen as an acceptable Malay leader, even to urban Chinese, and since it was the DAP's failure to sustain its working relationship with S46 in the Gagasan Rakyat that acted against the party, the re-emergence of a more unified opposition appears imperative.

The failure of the Gagasan Rakyat experiment, however, suggests that the new opposition coalition or party can only survive if it is seen to have no links, either directly or indirectly, with PAS. This is unlikely given that S46 would not want to jeopardize its working relationship with PAS to pursue the possibility of a national opposition coalition comprising parties professing disparate ideological stands. However, the opposition parties, especially the DAP and S46, have publicly stated the need to bring in a younger, more vibrant and energetic leadership, and reorganize their party machineries. But if this is to have much impact, and if these parties wish to make progress, the election results underscore the urgency with which they have to project a more credible and broadly acceptable multi-racial image. Since S46 seems determined to make the restoration of "Malay rights" its rallying cry, it is unlikely that the party will be able to regain non-Malay support.²

Another UMNO Fragmentation?

Of the BN's 162 parliamentary seats, 89 were won by UMNO in constituencies in all states except Sarawak where UMNO does not have a presence. This figure was only seven seats short of the number UMNO would have required to be able to form a government on its own.³ Undoubtedly, most of the MCA's victories in the 30 constituencies, and the seven each won by the MIC and Gerakan, were due to the support received by their candidates from UMNO's machinery and Mahathir's increased popularity among the urban non-*bumiputera* (Table 10). Since the MCA and Gerakan's popularity has always been dependent on UMNO's willingness to accommodate Chinese demands, the Chinese may now even look beyond Chinese BN parties directly to UMNO if the latter is accommodating enough of Chinese demands. Furthermore, although Malay unity, which helped to perpetuate UMNO's hegemony in the BN before the late 1980s, has declined, UMNO can still hope to sustain its dominant position in government without experiencing any threat from the MCA and the Gerakan since Mahathir's personal popularity is so overwhelming among non-Malays.

It is, however, unlikely that UMNO will dispense with its main ethnically-based partners in the BN, even if the trend among voters is to vote less along ethnic or religious lines. Although UMNO remains the dominant political force, given its diminishing popularity among the rural Malays, its traditional bastion of support, its need to retain ethnically-based non-*bumiputera* partners must be viewed as imperative.

The need for maintaining such a coalition is also necessary given the rather contentious situation within UMNO. The squabbling, jostling, and realignments of loyalty within the party — which began long before its candidates were named for the election — will persist, particularly between

TABLE 10: NUMBER OF MALAYSIAN PARLIAMENTARY AND STATE SEATS WON BY
MAIN BN COMPONENT PARTIES, 1995
(Number of Seats Contested in Parentheses)

State	Political Parties													
	UMNO		MCA		MIC		Gerakan		PBB					
	P	S	P	S	P	S	P	S	P	S	P	S	P	S
Perlis	3	(3)	13	(13)	-	(-)	2	(2)	-	(-)	-	(-)	-	(-)
Kedah	13	(13)	26	(28)	2	(2)	4	(4)	-	(-)	2	(2)	-	(-)
Kelantan	2	(13) ^a	6	(42)	-	(-)	1	(1)	-	(-)	-	(-)	-	(-)
Terengganu	7	(8)	24	(31)	-	(-)	1	(-)	-	(-)	-	(-)	-	(-)
Penang	4	(4)	12	(12)	2	(3)	9	(9)	-	(-)	1	(1)	2	(4)
Perak	11	(11)	30	(30)	7	(7)	13	(14)	2	(2)	3	(3)	3	(3)
Pahang	8	(8)	28	(28)	3	(3)	7	(8)	-	(-)	1	(1)	-	(-)
Selangor	8	(8)	30	(30)	6	(6)	11	(12)	3	(3)	3	(3)	-	(-)
N. Sembilan	4	(4)	20	(20)	2	(2)	7	(8)	1	(1)	2	(2)	-	(-)
Malacca	3	(3)	16	(16)	1	(2)	5	(8)	-	(-)	1	(1)	-	(-)
Johore	13	(13)	25	(25)	6	(6)	11	(11)	1	(1)	2	(2)	-	(-)
K. Lumpur	3	(3)			1	(4)			-	(-)	2	(3)	-	(-)
Labuan	1	(1)			-	(-)			-	(-)	-	(-)	-	(-)
Sarawak ^b	-	(-)			-	(-)			-	(-)	-	(-)	10	(10)
Sabah ^b	9	(10)			-	(-)			-	(-)	-	(-)	-	(-)
Total	89	(102)	230	(275)	30	(35)	71	(77)	7	(7)	15	(15)	7	(10)
											22	(26)	10	(10)

P: Parliamentary seats; S: State seats.

a. UMNO's nomination for one seat was rejected.

b. There were no state elections in Sarawak and Sabah; the PBB, holds the largest number of state seats in Sarawak.

SOURCE: *New Straits Times*, 27 April 1995.

the pro- and anti-Anwar factions. Its list of candidates indicated that a number of Anwar's close associates — including some from ABIM, who had hoped to be fielded over more influential UMNO members — found themselves sidelined. The minimal changes to the post-election Cabinet and in the line-up of Mentri Besar following the election was ostensibly to emphasize continuity. UMNO Vice-President Muiyiddin Yassin, the former Mentri Besar of Johore and an Anwar ally — he obtained the highest number of votes among the three vice-presidents during the 1993 party election — was appointed Minister of the relatively minor Ministry of Culture and Sports. UMNO Youth Acting President, Nazri Aziz, and the former Deputy Chief Minister of Penang, Ibrahim Saad, both strong Anwar supporters, were appointed Deputy Ministers in the Prime Minister's Department where Mahathir can presumably monitor their activities. Interestingly, after the 1986 General Elections, when the rift occurred between Mahathir and his deputy, Musa Hitam, the latter's close ally, Ajib Ahmad, then Mentri Besar of Johore, was appointed Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's department before disappearing into political oblivion, while the Pahang Mentri Besar, Najib Razak, then also seen as a Musa ally, was named Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports. Saloman Selamat, Anwar's former political secretary, who was tipped to be the next Selangor Mentri Besar, was given the Shah Alam parliamentary seat and remains a backbencher. Sidek Baba, another Anwar ally from ABIM and a candidate for the Chief Ministership of Malacca, remains an ordinary UMNO member. Former National Unity Minister Napsiah Omar, the UMNO Wanita Deputy leader who was vocal in her support of Anwar, was — as anticipated — appointed to the state executive committee in Negeri Sembilan. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, a former ABIM member and the UMNO Youth Information Chief, was made a parliamentarian but sent to the backbenches.

Meanwhile, several Anwar rivals were appointed to influential posts. Najib Razak, another UMNO Vice-President who was disappointed not to emerge as Anwar's right-hand man after the 1993 party election, was given a significant promotion with his appointment as Education Minister. Syed Hamid Albar who is not closely associated with Anwar was given the important Defence portfolio while Musthapa Mohamad, who is associated with Daim Zainuddin, was given ministerial status through his appointment at the newly-created Ministry of Entrepreneurial Development. Meanwhile, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Rafidah Aziz retained their influential Foreign and International Trade and Industry portfolios respectively.

The most important manoeuvres, however, took place at state level. In Kedah, Anwar's principal adversary former Agriculture Minister Sanusi Junid was tipped to eventually take over as Mentri Besar although the incumbent state government leader, Osman Aroff, was re-appointed to the post. In Penang, a close associate of another Anwar adversary, Abdullah

Ahmad Badawi, was appointed Deputy Chief Minister, while in Selangor and Perak, the incumbents, both no longer considered particularly close to Anwar, were retained as Mentris Besar. In Negeri Sembilan, another Anwar foe, Isa Samad, was retained as Mentri Besar, while in Johore, Ghani Othman, the former Youth and Sports Minister who is not identified particularly with Anwar, was appointed Mentri Besar. In Terengganu, another Anwar rival, former Public Enterprises Minister Yusof Noor, was tipped to take over as Mentri Besar soon, while in Pahang, Khalil Yaacob, an UMNO veteran not particularly aligned with Anwar, retained his post. In Perlis, Shahidan Kassim, who is not seen as an Anwar ally, was appointed Mentri Besar.

Although more changes are likely in the future, the minimal number of changes among Mentri Besar appointees suggests that Mahathir is cleverly securing greater loyalty by keeping everyone's future uncertain. With Mahathir loyalists leading the state governments and stronger in the Cabinet, it is likely that Anwar may face great difficulty in retaining the overwhelming UMNO divisional support which he obtained in 1993 though he is unlikely to be challenged in 1996. Even though Anwar was retained as Minister of Finance, the rather minor portfolio secured by his main ally in the Cabinet, Muhyiddin, ensures that he is still in no position to extend significant patronage in the government to even secure his own future.

However, if the Islamic rhetoric propagated by PAS continues to gather momentum, UMNO will probably have to depend more on Anwar, rather than Mahathir, to stem the tide. Unlike Mahathir, Anwar is still respected in Islamic circles for his knowledge of Islam and his attempts to inculcate more Islamic values within the government. Anwar's moderate stand on issues and his promotion of modernist Islamic views may also help him retain the support of the urban electorate, while curbing PAS's influence in the rural Malay heartland. If the need arises for a vision of politics that must be articulated on essentially moral positions, and if the question of spiritual values increasingly enters the public sphere, Anwar would appear to be one of very few leaders in UMNO who can respond persuasively and still be taken seriously. Today, although many, especially among the urban electorate, doubt that politics can be morally based, some of the members of the emerging Malay middle class are more insistent on the need for a new kind of politics based on a spiritual perspective. Recognizing this, some UMNO leaders like Anwar have been articulating their calls for more transparency and accountability in government, while Mahathir has been seen to occasionally raise the issue of morality in his speeches.

However, with UMNO now having such a dominant control over the Malaysian Government, it is unlikely that such discussion will significantly transcend mere rhetoric. It is, thus, improbable that there will be much increase in democratization, accountability, and openness within the

administration. Rather, UMNO leaders — probably taking their cue from Mahathir — have been urging the government to force PAS to omit "Islam" from its name, as it suggests that the party's political activities have a religious dimension unlike UMNO's more secular orientation.⁴ More draconian action may follow: government leaders have often expressed the need to check PAS's influence; Mahathir has even suggested that this is necessary because there is a danger that the party will turn into "another Al-Arqam, but this time on a bigger scale and uglier because PAS members are resorting to violence" and that "[t]his religious game in which the *akidah* (faith) of members are exploited and misled is dangerous. We know that the younger PAS members have already formed suicide squads".⁵ Later the Prime Minister also confirmed that "[w]e will study taking similar action like that (taken against Al-Arqam)."

As there have been minimal moves to broaden democracy in Malaysia since Mahathir came to power in 1981, and as the Prime Minister has even tried to redefine democracy, ostensibly to accommodate the multi-ethnic population of the country, the possibility of greater democratization is doubtful, especially in view of the factionalized state of affairs within UMNO. Changes may depend primarily on machinations within UMNO. Given Mahathir's current popularity, his obvious intent on serving out his five-year term, and the consolidation of his power, it is improbable that divided loyalties within UMNO will pose a serious threat to his leadership or portend major changes in future.

Notes

1. After some debate on the matter among opposition parties and due particularly to Razaleigh's wish not to take up the post, Kit Siang was returned as Opposition Leader.
2. Even after the general election, S46 Information Chief Ahmad Shabery Cheek insisted that while the party had been first formed to revive the "old" UMNO, it was now going to pursue its new stand — "Perjuangan Melayu" (Malay struggle) — to protect the rights of the Malays, even though the party recognized that this might alienate non-*bumiputera*. Shabery made these comments during the presentation of his paper, "S46's Presence: Is it True that its Influence is Declining?", during University of Malaya's seminar on the 1995 General Elections held on 18 May 1995.
3. If, however, the ten seats won by the PBB, the main *bumiputera* party in Sarawak, are added to UMNO's total, these two *bumiputera*-based parties' joint total of 99 would exceed the 96 seats needed to form the federal government.

PBB has been highlighted because it has been the dominant political party in Sarawak since 1970 and is headed by the powerful state leader, Taib Mahmud, a former federal minister who shares a close relationship with many top UMNO leaders.

4. See *New Straits Times*, 14 June 1995.
5. See *The Sun*, 7 May 1995.
6. See *New Straits Times*, 7 May 1995.

Glossary

ABIM	Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement)
AKIM	Angkatan Keadilan Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Justice Movement)
APU	Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (United Islamic Movement)
Berjasa	Barisan Jama'ah Islamiah (Islamic People's Front)
BN	Barisan Nasional (National Front)
DAP	Democratic Action Party
Gagasan	Gagasan Rakyat (People's Movement)
Gerakan	Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement)
IPF	All-Malaysian Indian Progressive Front
ISA	Internal Security Act
MCA	Malaysian Chinese Association
MIC	Malaysian Indian Congress
PAS	Parti Islam SeMalaysia (Malaysian Islamic Party)
PBB	Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (United Bumiputera Party)
PBS	Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah United Party)
PRM	Parti Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Party)
SAPP	Sabah Progressive Party
S46	Parti Melayu Semangat 46 (Spirit of 1946 Malay Party)
UMNO	United Malays' National Organisation

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